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Regional economic development strategies such as cluster-based development are
becoming increasingly popular with policymakers. Yet, the role of government in cluster
development and sustainability is not clearly understood. However, network governance
theory provides an ideal framework to better understand this role. This research attempts
to fill the gap between cluster theory and public administration by testing a
political/institutional context model developed by Miller (2006) that attempts to explain
the extent of cluster-based economic development policies considering the
political/institutional context. A collective case study focusing on the shipbuilding cluster
in Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi was conducted. A total of 24 in-depth interviews
were completed with key informants from economic development organizations,
government institutions, and the shipbuilding industry. The major findings of the study
indicate that (1) civic entrepreneurs, tax structures, and elected officials are not correlated
with the extent of cluster-based policies; (2) the traditionalistic political subculture in the
region is a major limiting factor for the development of governance structures suitable for
cluster-based economic development and upgrading; (3) participants were highly
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satisfied with workforce and infrastructure development policies while government
activities and programs had the lowest satisfaction; (4) the findings of this study show no
support for a clear factor policy grouping as argued by Porter; and (5) network
governance theory provides an ideal framework to build governance structures focused
on linkages and formal/informal relationships that are more suitable for cluster-based
development ameliorating the effects of a traditionalistic political culture. The
contributions of this study become more important because of recent threats to the
shipbuilding cluster in the Gulf Coast. The ability of government to adapt and facilitate
the development and upgrading of the cluster will prove critical for the overall economic
and social vitality of the region.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Problem Statement
Since the introduction of the competitive framework by Porter (1990), a wealth of
research has been conducted regarding clusters and the competitiveness of regions.
Studies have shown that clusters have a positive impact on a region increasing
productivity, wages, and innovation (Bernat, 1999; Gibbs & Bernat, 2001; Porter, 2003).
Thus, understanding how clusters develop and are maintained is critical for regions and
states that have or will pursue cluster-based economic development policies. Ironically
however, understanding the role politics and governance institutions 1 play in designing,
implementing, and supporting cluster-based economic development policies is lacking.
Combining cluster-based economic development literature with network governance
literature can fill this gap between governance and development.
In part, a great bulk of cluster research has focused on identifying and measuring
industrial clusters (Cortright, 2006) since one of the major criticisms of cluster theory is
its vagueness in defining both the geographic and industrial scope of clusters (Martin &
Sunley, 2003). Combinations of quantitative and qualitative methods have been utilized
to provide in-depth cluster studies. A quantitative approach helps identify clusters
utilizing macro-level variables such as number of jobs, establishments, patents, and wage
1

The terms government, politics and governance institutions, and public administration refer to the same
concept and are used interchangeably throughout this study.

1

data (Porter, 2003). On the other hand, a qualitative methodology can go more in depth
potentially identifying emerging clusters and better capturing the interrelationships within
the cluster and among the multiple actors that support and enhance the cluster as argued
by network governance theory (Rosenfeld, Liston, Kingslow, & Fromm, 2000; Austrian,
2000). Porter’s (1990) diamond has been extremely valuable in providing a framework to
study clusters from a business/competitive perspective but has fallen short in providing a
framework to assess the role of public administration in the competitiveness of regions.
Therefore, network governance theory has the potential to better describe and explain the
role public administration has in the competitiveness of regions.
Miller (2006) identified this gap from both public administration and economic
development perspectives. He developed a model that provides a framework to assess the
role of public administration in cluster-based economic development. Thus, the first
objective of my dissertation is to test Miller’s model holding constant the cluster type
(traded–traded clusters compete across regions, can locate anywhere, and show a higher
level of productivity and innovation) and the stage of development (mature), the
statewide political culture (traditionalistic), and the overall economic development
context (Gulf Coast “megaregion”).
The second objective is to relate the findings to network governance literature.
Thereby, this dissertation is contributing to public policy and administration, cluster
theory, political culture, network governance, and economic development literatures.
Furthermore, the results will provide critical information regarding the relationships
between the political/institutional context, political culture, network governance theory,
and public administration. This understanding provides key information regarding
2

government’s role in industrial cluster development and sustainability, and how network
governance theory could be employed in a traditionalistic political culture to support the
creation, maintenance, and development of industrial clusters.
The underlying question guiding this research is the following: how accurately
does Miller’s (2006) public administration model explain the extent of cluster-based
economic development policies? Thus, quantitative and qualitative methods were utilized
to (1) select and validate the existence of the shipbuilding cluster primarily employment
and establishment location quotient analysis; (2) test the hypotheses derived from
Miller’s (2006) model; and (3) understand which government policies as argued by Porter
(2000) were perceived with a high satisfaction by the participants. Semi-structured
interviews to key informants in the industry, government, and regional organizations
were completed.

Research Design
The purpose of this study is to test a political/institutional context model utilizing
cluster theory, political culture, and network governance theory in an effort to understand
what influences the extent of cluster-based policies as well as the level of government
involvement in cluster development. Hypotheses were derived from Miller’s framework
and data was gathered through a series of semi-structured interviews gathering both
qualitative and quantitative data. The semi-structured interview instrument contained
both a qualitative and a quantitative component. The qualitative component gathered a
valuable history of the industrial cluster under study and the role government has played
throughout the years in its development. The quantitative component gathered data
necessary to test specific hypotheses. Furthermore, the data gathered provided an
3

understanding of the current policies in place and how they relate to Porter’s examples of
policies addressing each of the four factors in his cluster diamond. The implications of
the findings were discussed utilizing network governance theory (NGT).
Key Findings
The major findings of the study indicate that (1) civic entrepreneurs, tax
structures, and elected officials are not correlated with the extent of cluster-based
policies; (2) the traditionalistic political subculture in the region is a major limiting factor
for the development of governance structures suitable for cluster-based economic
development and upgrading; (3) participants were highly satisfied with workforce and
infrastructure development policies while government activities and programs ranked in
the lowest satisfaction; (4) Porter’s examples of policies enhancing each of the diamond
factors were not supported by the findings of this study; and (5) network governance
theory provides an ideal framework to build governance structures focused on linkages
and formal/informal relationships that are more suitable for cluster-based development
ameliorating the effects of a traditionalistic political culture.
Limitations
A couple of limitations are related to this study. First and foremost is the fact that
the findings of this study are geographically specific but transferable to other states or
regions that have a traditionalistic political culture. This geographically specific area
includes counties/parishes in Louisiana, Alabama, and Mississippi. Second, although the
sample was weighted and the major shipyards in the region participated, the industry
overall was underrepresented. Furthermore, only major and medium-sized shipyards were
contacted leaving out numerous smaller but important shipyards as well as the supporting
4

and related industries within the cluster. This was done because the objective of this
study was to understand the political/institutional context and not the underlying linkages
and relationships within the cluster. Third, because of the high degree of specialization of
this research study, a high level of specialized knowledge was required of both the
political/institutional context and its interaction with the shipbuilding cluster limiting the
overall population and thus the sample size. Future studies can focus on including more
clusters with a specific political culture as well as conducting the research in partnership
with representatives from other states and regions to expand the overall population and
participation rate.
Organization of the Dissertation
Chapter 2 discusses three streams of literature related to this research and
concludes with the expectations of this research. First, cluster theory and Miller’s
political/institutional context framework are reviewed. The former sets the stage to
understand the importance of this dissertation while the latter will serve as the theoretical
framework. Second, network governance theory was reviewed in an effort to better
understand the interrelationships and linkages emerging in public administration and how
these can be used to develop governance structures more suitable for cluster-based
development. Finally, political culture literature is reviewed in an effort to understand the
overall context under which cluster-based economic development takes place and
understand the degree of government involvement in economic development.
Chapter 3 discusses the research methodology. A justification of a mixed methods
approach as well as the semi-structured interview is provided along with the selection of
the industrial cluster. Furthermore, an explanation of the operationalization of the
5

political/institutional context model is discussed. Finally, a description of the three
different sectors selected for validation purposes is provided.
Chapter 4 discusses the findings regarding the cluster history including the role of
government. Particular themes that emerged after conducting the interviews are presented
as well as the perception of government’s role in each of the three participant sectors
interviewed. This chapter provides crucial background information and the context
understanding required for this research project.
Chapter 5 tests the hypotheses identified and discusses the findings of this
research study regarding the political/institutional context model. Furthermore, the
policies identified through the interviews are analyzed utilizing Porter’s diamond theory.
This understanding of the policies and where they fit within the diamond model provides
information in areas where policy improvement is required to further enhance the
industrial cluster within a traditionalistic political culture context.
Chapter 6 concludes this research study by discussing the implications,
limitations, and potential areas for future research. This chapter also presents a discussion
regarding the implications that this particular industrial cluster has on governance
structures currently in place in the region and the role network governance theory can
play in developing these governance structures and ameliorating the effects of a
traditionalistic political culture in cluster support and development.

6

CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
Three streams of literature are discussed in this section to better understand the
relationship between cluster theory, role of government, cluster upgrading, network
governance theory, and political culture. First, an overview of cluster theory is discussed
with a focus on the limitation of the theory in understanding the role public
administration plays in cluster-based economic development. Miller’s (2006) model is
provided as a resource for understanding public administration in cluster-based economic
development as well as the political/institutional context. Second, network governance
theory is reviewed in an effort to understand the relationships between cluster theory and
public administration, especially regarding cluster upgrading. Network governance theory
is the ideal framework to understand and strengthen these relationships. Third, political
culture is discussed in an effort to shed some light on the potential impact political
culture may have in cluster theory, public administration, and network governance. To
conclude, the final section focuses on combining these streams of literature and discusses
some research expectations.
Cluster Theory
Porter (1990) introduced the competitive framework to explain why some regions
achieve sustained productivity raising the standard of living of their citizens. Porter’s
main argument is that competition among firms, and to a certain degree cooperation,
generates innovation, which in turn spurs economic growth. Thus, a geographical
7

concentration of related industries innovates more and is more competitive than firms in
the same industry that are “isolated.” The author presents a four-factor model that
explains the development, extent, and sustainability of industrial clusters.
The four factors discussed by Porter (1990) are as follows: (1) factor (input)
conditions ranging from tangible assets to information, legal systems, and university
research institutes. These factors should improve efficiency, quality, and specialization;
(2) demand conditions refer to the existence of sophisticated and demanding customers.
These customers pressure firms to improve; (3) firm strategy, structure, and rivalry refers
to a context in which forms of investment are encouraged. Similarly, a vigorous
competition among local rivals is necessary; and (4) related and supporting industries
refer to the presence of capable suppliers as well as competitive related industries.
Because these four factors are dynamic and not static, they result in competitive
industries that are not evenly dispersed geographically; rather, they appear in
geographical “clusters.” Moreover, the author argues that no particular element is
responsible for generating a cluster. Rather, it is more likely that a single element serves
as a catalyst and strengthens the other elements.
Further, Porter (1990) argued that chance and government were two “external”
factors involved in cluster development as well. The author defines chance as exogenous
and unpredictable factors such as national crisis, major industry bankruptcy, etc. that
exert an influence on the cluster. Regarding government, Porter simply argues that its
role is to influence the other four elements. Figure 1 shows Porter’s diamond model
including all four factors and the two “external” factors.

8

Figure 1

Porter’s Diamond Model (Porter, 2000)

In a later study, Porter (2000) identified basic roles government can play and what
influence they have in each of the four “diamond” elements expanding on his previous
work. Some examples include providing an educated workforce, appropriate
infrastructure, timely and accurate data, rules and incentives governing competition, and
developing and implementing a change process. These policies influence the factors,
which in turn strengthen and enhance the cluster. The author also argues that a clusterbased strategy highlights the importance of the “roles of government at several
geographic levels” (p. 29). According to the author, industrial clusters need to be an
important component of state and local policies, not just national policies, implying some
9

industrial cluster development and sustainability responsibility falls on the state and local
level.
After conducting a worldwide cluster meta-study, Van der Linde (2003) found
that in 39.8% of the clusters analyzed, Porter’s diamond element of factor conditions was
the most common cause of cluster formation; 26.3% reported the cause as other (e.g.,
government, random events, entrepreneurial activity, prolonged strikes, etc.); and 18.8%
of the clusters analyzed formed mainly because of demand conditions. In other words,
chance and government were responsible for the creation of almost a third of the clusters
analyzed. This finding emphasizes the need of understanding the role of public
administration in cluster formation and sustainability. Of the 26% of clusters formed
because of other causes, 26.5% included government actions and only one of the 186
clusters analyzed was formed directly because of “conscious government action” (Van
der Linde, 2003, p. 147).
Role of Government
While Porter’s (1990) “vague” description of government’s role in cluster
development and Van der Linde’s (2003) conclusion that political intervention did not
play a solely decisive role in cluster formation and/or sustainability indicate an irrelevant
and unclear role of government, Wickham (2005) found that as a matter of fact,
government’s role is “far more significant than the exogenous one theorised by Porter”
(p. 15) and that not only does government plays a significant role, but also plays different
roles throughout the cluster’s industrial life cycle (Klepper, 1996), which include
“embryonic, emerging, or mature and the cluster can be growing, stagnating, or
declining” (Enright, 2003, p. 102). Wickham (2005) argues that during the emergence of
10

the cluster, government enhanced the cluster reputation and maximized the synergistic
relationships between shipbuilders and their suppliers; later government formalized these
relationships and even recruited more innovative shipbuilders to provide more sources of
sales to the cluster’s suppliers.
Similarly, Enright (2003) identifies five levels at which government is involved in
a cluster. The non-existent role is one in which there are no cluster-based economic
policies in place; the catalytic role is one in which government arranges for parties to
come together but its involvement is limited; a supportive role is one in which in addition
to getting groups together, government provides cluster-specific investments in
infrastructure and education/training and plays a passive indirect role; a directive role is
one in which government implements cluster programs to reshape local economies.
Finally, an interventionist role is one in which government, in addition to implementing
cluster programs, makes major decisions regarding the cluster (rather than the private
sector); provides substantial subsidies, protections, or regulations; and has major
ownership and/or control of the cluster. Enright (2003) also argues that different levels of
government are involved in cluster-based economic development strategies and that the
ideal level of government (e.g., state, regional, local) involved should be one that
corresponds to the geographic scope of the cluster itself and has “substantial influence
over relevant programs and expenditures” (Enright, 2003, p. 119).
Furthermore, Enright (2003) mentions that governments with different political
ideologies and philosophies (e.g., conservative/liberal) implement cluster-based
economic development strategies. This in part can be explained, according to Enright,
because the degree of government involvement (i.e., non-existent, catalytic, supportive,
directive, and interventionist) varies and the fact that different strategies, tools, and
11

tactics are all labeled under a cluster policies umbrella. Finally, Enright (2003) mentions
that in developed nations, local or regional governments are responsible for most of the
cluster initiatives, while in developing nations, the national government takes the lead.
This implies that state and local governments have a responsibility and therefore more
flexibility regarding industrial cluster development.
Enright’s (2003) five levels of government involvement are not the only way to
classify government’s role, as Su and Hung (2009) analyzed a biotechnology cluster in
two nations and found their origins to be either spontaneous or policy driven.
Independently of their origins, both clusters had five success factors in common: (1)
human capital, (2) financial capital, (3) entrepreneurship, (4) social capital, and (5)
networking. Even though these two clusters with different origins shared success factors,
these factors came to be and developed in different ways according to the authors. In the
case of the policy-driven cluster, government provided both human and financial capital.
However, its levels of entrepreneurship and social capital are still emerging, resulting in
loose networks.
On the other hand, the spontaneous and older cluster obtained its human and
financial capital from venture capitalists and leading universities. The entrepreneurship
and social capital in this particular cluster is strong, partly because the cluster began from
academic spin-offs and venture capitalists’ support, resulting in tight networks that
benefit the cluster overall. The authors also emphasize the importance of understanding
the institutional context and history of the cluster. Thus, networks are stronger and more
effective in clusters that originated spontaneously.
With multiple studies providing these different classifications for the role of
government in cluster development and in an effort to understand the
12

political/institutional context and the extent of cluster-based policies, Miller (2006)
provides a framework to assess the political/institutional context under which clusterbased economic development strategies are designed and implemented.
This framework contemplates structural factors, political/institutional predictors,
and a network governance moderator in an effort to explain the extent of cluster-based
policies. Structural factors include the market model, evolutionary economics, and civic
culture. The political/institutional predictors include tax structure, state context, elected
officials, institutional arrangements, and professionalism. Finally, the network
governance moderator discusses whether the private sector or the public sector leads
economic development efforts in a particular community. Figure 2 shows Miller’s model.

Figure 2

Miller’s Political/Institutional Model
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Miller (2006) developed this framework based in part on the power community
literature including Stone (1989), Molotch (1976), Logan and Molotch (1987), and
Henton et al. (1997) among others. The author mentions several questions that need to be
asked within each component (e.g., structural factors, political/institutional predictors,
etc.) in order to understand the political/institutional context. According to Miller (2006),
the elements within the network governance moderator include regimes, growth
machines, and civic entrepreneurs. Based on the power community literature reviewed by
Miller (2006), regimes are informal yet stable groups that have access to institutional
resources and have a significant impact on local economic development policy and
implementation; growth machines are defined as individuals or institutions that directly
benefit from economic development, such as landowners, bankers, lawyers, etc.; civic
entrepreneurs are individuals from private-sector businesses but also include public and
civic organizations that help forge powerful productive linkages with their vision and
commitment.
According to Miller (2006), this framework will “allow researchers to begin
asking the right questions regarding governance structures needed for cluster-based
economic development” (Miller, 2006, p. 231). The network governance moderator may
be public or private sector driven. Either way, public administrators are responsible for
holding the network governance moderator together and in some cases also fill a
leadership role. This leadership role is filled when there is a weak regime and/or growth
machine and civic entrepreneurs are not engaged. Thus, Miller’s research concludes that
the public administrator’s role will vary depending on the network governance moderator
and that private sector driven is preferable.

14

Thus, government does play a role in cluster development influencing each of the
four factors (Porter, 2000) through cluster-based policies, whose extent is explained by a
political/institutional context (Miller, 2006), and at the same time gets involved at
different levels (Enright, 2003) and at different times (Wickham, 2005) throughout the
cluster’s history. Further, the cluster’s institutional context and history as well as its
origin, being either spontaneous or policy driven, determine how strong or how weak its
networks will be along with its social, human, and financial capital (Su & Hung, 2009).
However, government does and should play a more advanced role (Porter, 2000) that is
critical for industrial clusters: facilitating the development and upgrading of a cluster. See
Table 1 for a summary based on the literature discussed of the role of government in
cluster development.
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Table 1

Role of Government in Cluster Development

Author

Year

Porter

1990, 2000

Enright

2003

Wickham

Key Findings
- To influence each of the four factors
in his diamond model
- Non-existent
- Catalytic
- Supportive
- Directive
- Interventionist
- Government’s role more significant
and endogenous than the role theorized
by Porter
- Government plays different roles
throughout the cluster’s history; role is
not static
- Origin of cluster (spontaneous or
policy-driven) as well as cluster’s
history and institutional context
determine the strength of networks and
level of human, financial, and social
capital in the cluster
- Provides political/institutional
framework to assess the extent of
cluster-based policies
- Structural factors, inst./political
predictors, and network governance
moderator determine the extent of
cluster-based policies

2005

Su & Hung

2009

Miller

2006

Cluster Upgrading
When talking about his four factors and the role government plays influencing
each factor, Porter (2000) also discussed a fifth more advanced government role in
regards to “facilitating cluster development and upgrading” (p. 26.) He argues that the
basic roles are geared toward a more general business environment while the fifth, more
advanced, role moves beyond factor competition into cluster development and
competitiveness. This fifth more advanced role requires a level of government
involvement that goes beyond providing a macroeconomic stability.
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Pietrobelli and Rabellotti (2004) looked at the role policies played in upgrading
clusters in Latin America. The authors define upgrading as “innovating to increase value
added” 2 (p. 6). The study concluded that policies designed to upgrade clusters need to
consider two dimensions at the same time. First, the territorial factor needs to be
considered. This factor includes the social and cultural identity as well as the
geographical concentration and specialization of the cluster. Second, a linkage factor
needs to be considered. This factor includes the variety and richness of vertical and
horizontal linkages within the cluster. Therefore, policy instruments targeting the
development of local competitive factors such as infrastructure or local know-how also
need to target the promotion of linkages among the cluster such as programs to establish
business associations and/or upgrade contractors. Finally and according to the authors,
human capital and time are two essential resources for these types of policies.
Going beyond Porter’s (2000) argument in that government can influence all four
factors and in an effort to capture the positive impacts of the factors associated with the
competitiveness of firms located in clusters, Schmitz (1995) defined the term collective
efficiency as consisting of two main components: local external economies and joint
action. Local external economies were explored by Marshall in the 1920s and some
examples are a market for specialized skilled labor, market inputs, improved market
access, easy access to specialized knowledge, and rapid dissemination of information.
According to Schmitz (1995), “the concept of external economies is essential to
understand efficiency advantages which small firms derive from clustering” (p. 535).

2

According to Porter (2000) innovation in a cluster occurs because of the close proximity of related
industries causing them to innovate in part because of sheer pressure. On the other hand, Miller and Stich
(2009) argue that “having a group of smart people (and organizations) in a setting where they can share
ideas and learn from each other on a particular topic leads to new and better ideas [innovation]” (p. 177).
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However according to Schmitz (1995), consciously pursued joint action is a
critical component distinguishing clusters from industrial districts. This joint action can
be vertical, horizontal, or multilateral (Pietrobelli & Rabellotti, 2004). Vertical linkages
refer to backward linkages with suppliers and subcontractors as well as forward linkages
with traders and buyers. Horizontal linkages refer to linkages with other producers in the
area, and finally, multilateral linkages refer to linkages with multiple local producers
through cluster-wide institutions.
Regarding the role of specific institutions within the cluster, Formica (2003)
argues that agency model organizations, or quasi-governmental public-private
partnerships, serving as an instrument of collaboration between government and
businesses are the “less effective means available to policymakers who would be willing
to induce governmental partnership both as a vehicle to reinforce existing clusters and a
propulsive factor in cluster building” (p. 243). He concludes that a free agent model, or
private sector service delivery, should replace the agent model to stimulate industrial selfgovernment within the cluster. This finding is similar to Miller’s (2006) in that private
sector-led economic development is more suitable for cluster development compared to
public sector leadership. In other words, the private sector should be responsible for
forging networks and partnerships within the cluster. See Table 2 for a summary of the
literature reviewed regarding the role of government in cluster upgrading.
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Table 2

Summary of Cluster Upgrading Literature

Author

Year

Porter

2000

Pietrobelli & Rabellotti

2004

Schmitz

Formica

Key Findings
- More advanced role
- To facilitate cluster development and
upgrading
- Policies that upgrade need to consider
territorial factor needs (including
social and cultural identity) and a
linkage factor
- Looked at the positive impacts of
factors associated with the
competitiveness of firms located in
clusters
- Defined collective efficiency
consisting of local external economies
and joint action
- Joint action can be vertical,
horizontal, or multilateral
- Agent model, or private sector, more
efficient to stimulate industrial selfgovernment than quasi governmental
public-private partnerships

1995

2003

In conclusion, networks, linkages, and partnerships lie at the heart of cluster
development, innovation, and upgrading (Pietrobelli & Rabelloti, 2004; Schmitz, 1995).
Government can play a more advanced role that involves creating, managing, and
strengthening networks between the cluster and external institutions since the private
sector is more effective at creating partnerships within the cluster (Formica, 2003). The
public administration theory of network governance seems ideal to help explain and
understand how government can play this more advanced role that requires stimulating,
developing, and strengthening networks and linkages.
Network Governance Theory
This section is divided into three parts. The first part will discuss the importance
of network governance theory in public administration. This first section will also focus
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on some theoretical propositions. The second part will discuss the role these theories play
in economic development and cluster development. Finally, the third section will discuss
empirical studies conducted utilizing these theories in an effort to understand how they
can help address issues faced primarily by local governments.
Network Governance and Public Administration
Frederickson (1999) argued that the twentieth century was a successful century
for American public administration. Major accomplishments, such as winning the space
race and the Second World War among others throughout the century, were effectively
implemented by public administration. However, according to the author, the field began
repositioning itself at the turn of the century. Public administration is moving away from
the clash of interests, competition, and winners and losers toward theories that focus
more on cooperation, networking, institutions, and governance. In other words, “a
repositioned public administration is the political science of making the fragmented and
disarticulated state work” (Frederickson, 1999, p. 702).
According to Frederickson (1999), several factors have played a role in the
disarticulation of the state. The main factors include economic activity, which essentially
is becoming more global and less local, and advances in telecommunication technology
that further impact the “traditional” state. These two factors have made boundaries and
borders, along with jurisdictions, to become blurry and unclear, especially in
metropolitan areas. This in turn has affected “traditional” public management, generating
new challenges and issues. In response, current public administration practices have
evolved trying to address these issues and at the same time are becoming the bedrock on
which theoretical perspectives are being built.
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Using institutionalism as a framework and based on network governance theory,
Frederickson (1999) defines a theory that ameliorates these issues and calls it
administrative conjunction. Administrative conjunction is the “array and character of
horizontal formal and informal association between actors representing units in a
networked public and the administrative behavior of those actors” (Frederickson, 1999, p.
708). In other words, conjunction is “primarily an administrative activity carried on by
like-minded institutional professionals” (Frederickson, 1999, p. 709). The author
concludes that public management professionals engage in administrative conjunction in
a voluntary manner replacing authority, while at the same time representing a generalized
public interest extending beyond their jurisdictions. This has profound implication for
cluster development since many clusters extend beyond county and state lines.
Agranoff and McGuire (2003) made an extensive review of empirical research on
network governance in an effort to show a theoretical connection between
intergovernmental and network management. The authors argue that public
administrators are involved in horizontal linkages with county governments, townships,
nongovernmental organizations, etc., in addition to the traditional top/down (vertical)
linkages with state and federal government. Furthermore, this network management takes
places within specific policy and institutional contexts that shape and affect the network
itself. This context is usually defined by policy preferences and choices that in turn
provide a gauge to the use and type of intergovernmental networks. This
intergovernmental and network management has many similarities with cluster
development and upgrading in that linkages exist and take place within specific policy
and institutional contexts.
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Provan and Milward (2001) developed a framework looking into three levels of
network analysis in an effort to understand network effectiveness. The authors analyzed
community-based, mostly publicly funded health, human, and welfare services
identifying key stakeholder groups as well as effectiveness criteria for each of the levels.
The three levels identified by the authors include community, network, and
organization/participant. The authors conclude that although it is difficult to evaluate a
network in terms of effectiveness because of the different players as well as different
objectives and outcomes, it is critical to understand the effectiveness of networks for
local, state, and national policymakers trying to provide better services.
These findings relate to cluster theory in two ways. First, the authors identify the
dynamics, relationships, and issues between the different types of levels within a network
that also exist in local and state governments trying to provide a service to businesses–for
example, a cluster. Second, the effectiveness criteria discussed is equally useful if
network governance between local and state governments is pursued in order to further
upgrade an industrial cluster.
On a similar note, Provan and Kenis (2008) identified three different forms of
network governance, proxies to measure their effectiveness, their inherent tensions, and
how these forms evolve. The three forms are participant-governed or shared participant
governance, lead organization-governed, and network administrative organization
(NAO). The former is the most flexible and can be formal or informal, while the latter
two are more formal and incorporate institutions and procedures. The authors argue that
for a network-level theory to evolve, an understanding that different configurations lead
to different network-level effects is critical. Therefore, the authors “marry” the two more
important research areas in this topic: network analytical and governance perspectives.
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These different forms of network governance and their ability to evolve resonate with Su
and Hung’s (2009) argument that the cluster origin, institutional context, and history
determine the strength of its networks and linkages.
Provan and Kenis (2008) conclude among other things that the original network
governance form is more than likely to change or evolve (more so if the original form
was a shared-participant), especially if the network is successful. The authors also
provide a series of propositions regarding the different network governance forms, their
critical contingency components, and evolution, laying the foundation for future research.
Finally and from a holistic point of view, the authors argue that a combination of
network-level outcomes, the form of the network governance, and the management of
tensions by what they called “network-level managers” within each form are “critical for
explaining network effectiveness” (p. 247).
Ansell and Gash (2008) define a similar term called “collaborative governance.”
They define this term as a “mode of governance [that] brings multiple stakeholders
together in common forums with public agencies to engage in consensus-oriented
decision making” (p. 543). The authors reach this definition and criteria joining both the
concepts that governance applies to rules and laws pertaining to the provision of public
goods, but also that governance is about collective decision making, including public and
private actors. This collective decision-making process benefits cluster development and
upgrading because of the multiple actors, private and public, involved.
Collaborative governance according to Ansell and Gash (2008) stresses six
important criteria: (1) forum is initiated by public agencies, (2) participants include
nonstate actors, (3) participants engage in decision making and are not merely
“consulted,” (4) forum is formally organized, (5) decisions are made by consensus, and
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(6) the focus of the collaboration is on public policy or management. The authors
developed a model that includes starting conditions, institutional design, a collaborative
process, facilitative leadership, and outcomes. The model focuses on what makes
collaborative governance more or less effective by conducting a meta-analysis of 137
cases of collaborative governance across a range of policy sectors. The collaborative
process variable is at the core of the model, while the other variables are either critical
contributions to or context for the collaborative process. This collaborative nature is
intrinsic in clusters and is one of its key characteristics. Thus, this collaborative
governance model describes a process that is already taking place in clusters and that is
useful to understand what is required for the external agents of the cluster to collaborate.
To conclude this brief overview of network governance theory and public
administration, Frederickson and Matkin (2005) operationalized Frederickson’s (1999)
administrative conjunction theory, analyzing the Kansas City metropolitan area. The
objective of this study was to explore intergovernmental cooperation in local
governments. Among some of the findings of the study is the fact that executive
functions, such as mayors, are more willing to cooperate than are legislative positions.
Similarly, public officials with experience in interlocal collaboration are more prone to
cooperate in future projects than officials with less experience in interlocal collaboration.
Table 3 shows a summary of the key findings regarding network governance and public
administration as it relates to cluster development.
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Table 3

Summary of Network Governance and Public Administration Findings

Author

Year

Frederickson

1999

Agranoff & McGuire

2003

Provan & Milward

2001

Provan & Kenis

2008

Ansell & Gash

2008

Frederickson & Matkin

2005

Key Findings
- Administrative conjunction based on
horizontal formal and informal
associations
- Intergovernmental and network
management taking place within specific
policy and institutional contexts
- Three levels of network analysis; identify
dynamics and relationships; discuss
effectiveness criteria
- Types of network governance and their
evolution
- Collaborative governance including
context and starting conditions
- Explores intergovernmental cooperation;
more experienced and with executive
functions cooperate more

Network Governance and Economic Development
Regarding economic development and network governance theory, Agranoff and
McGuire (1998) explored the intergovernmental networking component of economic
development in 237 cities. The authors found that a complex series of relationships exist
between three factors when promoting business development in urban areas. The first
factor is three different strategic types of networks involved in local economic
development (policy/strategy making, resource exchange, and project-based); different
determinants exist of the variation in the structure and composition of the networks
(leadership, managerial, policy, and locational), and the capacities needed to operate in
networks are different than those needed to operate in single organizations.
Agranoff and McGuire (1998) show that local economic development in the cities
analyzed involved a host of local public and private sectors but also a higher level of
government that set the development context. State and federal governments play a
pivotal role in the development of networks providing financial support, information,
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expertise, and advocate more collaboration with horizontal actors. The authors conclude
that networks are becoming the norm in public management and that the management of
these networks is becoming the primary operational concern. This conclusion is
paramount in that it implies that political culture is important.
In an effort to understand if insertion into global value chains enhances or
undermines local cluster upgrading strategies, Humphrey and Schmitz (2000) reviewed
four distinct streams of literature including new economic geography, business studies,
regional science, and innovation studies. The authors defined governance as the
“coordination of economic activities through non-market relationships” (p. 4). Further,
Humphrey and Schmitz distinguish between three types of governance: network, quasihierarchy, and hierarchy.
Humphrey and Schmitz (2000) identified a model of local/regional industrial
policy in which the “rapid diffusion of knowledge within the cluster do not just result
from incidental synergies, the ‘industrial atmosphere’, but are fostered by policy
networks of public and private actors” (p. 8). Further, the authors argue that local
governance plays a key role in the successful upgrading of clusters. This local
governance is influenced by the political culture in that particular region.
Regarding governance theory and urban issues, Feiock (2007) looked at the extent
to which voluntary cooperation and coordination among local governments can provide
solutions to regional problems. Benefits of cooperation and coordination are discussed,
such as collective and selective benefits. Furthermore, the author utilizes rational choice
to understand the transactions costs and benefits associated with interlocal agreements.
Feiock (2007) also looks at the contextual factors that have an impact on the
feasibility of interlocal agreements to take place, such as transaction characteristics of
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goods, characteristics of communities, political institutions, and the structure of policy
networks. The author discusses a series of propositions exploring the likelihood of the
emergence of cooperative intergovernmental agreements within each of the contextual
factors analyzed. Feiock (2007) concludes, “transaction costs are reduced by formal and
informal institutional arrangements” (p. 59) and that “voluntary governance is contingent
on contextual factors” (p. 60); therefore, a “better understanding of the context of
metropolitan governance not only advances our theoretical understanding of institutional
collective action, but it also has practical policy implications” (p. 60). Therefore, this
research holds the political culture constant.
Similarly, Visser (2004) looked at two voluntary regional councils in Michigan in
an effort to understand why some voluntary regional councils are successful and others
are not in “new regionalism.” The author defines “new regionalism” as “a policy agenda
and an action approach to effective governing metropolitan areas” (p. 51). The author
concluded that “virulent localism” might undercut these councils leading to their
potential demise. Also, Visser (2004) concludes that although voluntary regional councils
may not be an effective substitute for regional governance, it is far superior to interlocal
competition or isolationism, since it can produce collaboration and enhances the planning
skills of their members, instilling collaborative rather than competitive approaches among
local governments. This is important since clusters extend beyond counties and states,
emphasizing the needs of voluntary regional councils to sustain and develop the cluster.
Table 4 shows the summary of key findings regarding network governance and economic
development as it relates to cluster development and the role of government.
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Table 4

Summary of Network Governance and Economic Development Findings

Author

Year

Agranoff & McGuire

1998

Humphreys & Schmitz

2000

Feiock

2007

Visser

2004

Key Findings
Management of networks is becoming the
primary operational concern in public
management
Local governance plays a key role in
cluster upgrading (implies importance of
controlling for political culture)
A better understanding of the context leads
to advances in institutional collective
action (implies importance of controlling
for political culture)
Analyzes voluntary regional councils and
how these instill collaborative rather than
competitive approaches among local
governments

A couple of themes emerged from this literature review. First, engaging in
networks to enhance governance and better address complex issues has transaction costs
involved that need to be recognized. At this point, these agreements are voluntary,
implying that authority and hierarchy may not be necessary. In other words, there is an
implicit recognition that working together is sufficient to embrace regional governance
approaches rather than being forced by authority or policy.
Second, public management is constantly adapting to this new context, and theory
is only now starting to “catch up.” This second point is important because it implies that
theoretical perspectives are not yet solid enough to dictate and guide administrative
practices. However, the contributions of network governance theory to regional economic
development are enormous in that they provide a useful framework on which to build
regional jurisdictions with the potential to benefit industrial clusters.
Third, the costs and pitfalls of voluntary regional councils or interlocal
agreements are now beginning to be understood. This in turn paves the way for the
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development of regional economic development jurisdictions with boundaries that mirror
those of the industrial cluster. The local and regional economic development field is very
dynamic, and therefore, networks utilized to efficiently design and implement economic
development policies are constantly adapting to changing circumstances and contexts.
Furthermore, research shows that the successful upgrading of clusters relies in part on
networks of public and private actors (Esser et al., 1995; Humphrey & Schmitz, 2000;
Messner, 1997; Pietrobelli & Rabellotti, 2004; Schmitz, 1995). Thus, the evident overlap
between regional governance and cluster upgrading is the need of networks.
In summary, network governance theory is the critical link between public
administration and cluster-based economic development. Although the majority of the
literature reviewed regarding network governance theory refer to metropolitan areas and
the major issues and challenges they face, such as diffusion of jurisdictions and policy
burden spillovers, this stream of literature is useful for this study in two ways.
First and foremost, it demonstrates that collaboration and interlocal agreements
are possible between different political jurisdictions. As a matter of fact and as
Frederickson (1999) argued, these theories are the future of public administration from a
practical perspective. The role of public managers in the “hollow state” is not well
understood yet, but one thing is clear: public managers are spending more and more of
their time not only managing their own agencies but also building critical linkages with
other agencies. The ability or inability to build linkages has a profound impact on cluster
development and sustainability.
Second and more importantly, network governance theory can serve as the
framework to develop regional jurisdictions that align with the cluster’s boundaries, thus
allowing for the design and implementation of cluster-based policies that can further
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enhance or upgrade the cluster. Furthermore, network governance frameworks were
reviewed (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Frederickson, 1999; Provan & Milward, 2001; Provan &
Kenis, 2008) that could be useful when designing and implementing regional
jurisdictions, collaborations, and partnerships across city, county, and state lines.
However, other elements–in addition to networks and linkages both within and
outside the cluster–such as the market model, evolutionary economics, civic culture, and
social and cultural identity need to be considered when designing policies to facilitate the
development and upgrading of a cluster (Pietrobelli & Rabellotti, 2004) as well as to
understand the political/institutional context that determines the extent of cluster-based
policies (Miller, 2006; Su & Hung, 2009). As discussed throughout the previous section,
these additional elements impact the role of government in cluster development.
Therefore, understanding the political culture in which the cluster is immersed is
warranted.
Political Culture
Elazar (1984) provides a political culture theory built on migration patterns of
distinct racial, ethnic, and religious groups in the country. He argued that these immigrant
groups not only congregated in settlements but also migrated together and shared political
ideals. The results are three political subcultures that view politics, bureaucracy, and
government in different ways. Even though all subcultures exist in a particular state, one
in particular dominates. The three subcultures are moralistic, individualistic, and
traditionalistic.
According to Elazar (1984), a moralistic subculture is more concerned with the
public interest. This particular subculture uses government as a legitimate instrument to
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achieve the public good, mainly through welfare. Public administration is strong and
bureaucracies are more developed and enterprising than in other subcultures. Finally,
government is a major force in citizens’ lives.
In an individualistic political culture, political parties serve specific interests and
government exists to handle the demands of the people it serves. In contrast to the
moralistic subculture, private concerns are more important than the public good.
Bureaucracies are somewhat developed but not as much as in the moralistic subculture.
Elazar (1984) argues that the main characteristic of this subculture is that the community
should minimally intervene in private matters, and government should keep the
marketplace working properly.
The main characteristic of a traditionalistic subculture is the use of government to
maintain the hierarchical social order and defend traditional values. Bureaucracies are not
as developed as in the other subcultures, and they are not trusted. Landowners play a
dominant role in the political process, political power is concentrated in elites, and
citizens are not expected to play a major role in government (Elazar, 1984).
Table 5 shows the political subcultures by states (Elazar, 1984; Mead, 2004) and a
score based on a scale developed by Sharkansky (1969) and improved by Koven and
Mausolff (2002) when analyzing differences in state budgets. According to this improved
scale, a score of 9 is a pure traditionalistic state; a score of 5 is a pure individualistic
state; a score of 1 is a pure moralistic state. A total of 16 states have a traditionalistic
political culture, highlighting the importance of this research when understanding the
impact this culture has on cluster development and sustainability.
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Table 5

Political Cultures by State

Moralistic
Colorado (1.80)
Maine (2.33)
Michigan (2.00)
Minnesota (1.00)
North Dakota (2.00)
Oregon (2.00)
Utah (2.00)
Vermont (2.33)
Wisconsin (2.00)
Moralistic/Individualistic
California (3.55)
Idaho (2.50)
Iowa (2.00)
Kansas (3.66)
Montana (3.00)
New Hampshire (2.33)
South Dakota (3.00)
Washington (1.66)

Individualistic
Alaska (N/A)
Indiana (6.33)
New Jersey (4.00)
Nevada (N/A)
New Hampshire (2.33)

Traditionalistic
Mississippi (9.00)
South Carolina (8.75)
Tennessee (8.50)
Virginia (7.86)

Individualistic/Moralistic
Connecticut (3.00)
Illinois (4.72)
Pennsylvania (4.28)
Massachusetts (3.66)
Nebraska (3.66)
New York (3.62)
Ohio (5.16)
Rhode Island (3.00)
Wyoming (4.00)
Individualistic/Traditionalistic
Delaware (7.00)
Hawaii (8.25)
Maryland (7.00)
Missouri (7.66)

Traditionalistic/Moralistic
Arizona (5.66)
North Carolina (8.50)

Source: Koven & Mausolff (2002); Mead (2004)

Traditionalistic/Individualistic
Alabama (8.57)
Arkansas (9.00)
Florida (7.80)
Georgia (8.80)
Kentucky (7.40)
Louisiana (8.00)
New Mexico (7.00)
Oklahoma (8.25)
Texas (7.11)
West Virginia (7.33)

According to Lieske (1993), even though Elazar’s (1984) political culture
typology has been empirically tested in more than 100 studies, Elazar’s derivation of the
three political subcultures is not “based on any rigorous statistical procedures” (p. 889)
and has not been updated to reflect recent cultural changes. Moreover, Lieske (1993)
argues that Elazar’s typology including entire states and substate regions is somewhat
crude and does not allow “a great deal of empirical precision” (p. 889). Therefore
Lieske’s (1993) political subculture typology is more updated, is derived from replicable
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statistical procedures, and is available at the county level. A total of 10 subcultures were
identified: Germanic, Hispanic, Border, Anglo-French, Ethnic, Nordic, Blackbelt,
Heartland, Mormon, and Rurban.
Lieske (1993) mentions that in the Anglo-French subculture, about a third are
Catholic, residents are predominantly white, and it is not distinguishable from other
subcultures in proportion of college graduates, professionals, and managers. The
Blackbelt subculture is about a third black and has a high proportion of residents
employed in manufacturing and also has the highest levels of income inequality and
poverty. A well-educated and highly skilled workforce and stable family life characterize
the Mormon subculture. The Rurban and Ethnic subcultures have a highly educated and
skilled workforce, but the former is less dependent on manufacturing than the latter.
Both Lieske’s (1993) and Elazar’s (1984) political cultures have been used to
explain the variation in seven measures of public policy at the local level, including local
government revenues, local tax burden, educational expenditures, educational tax burden,
welfare expenditures, welfare tax burden, and local Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC). The main finding from this political culture research is the fact that
differences in political culture impact economic development policy and can be held
constant.
In addition, Boeckelman (1991) found that traditionalistic states engage more in
maintenance/attraction strategies rather than creation strategies pursued more by
moralistic states regarding state development policies. Maintenance/attraction strategies
focus on maintaining existing industries or recruiting branches of out-of-state firms
through lower tax rates and labor costs as well as granting concessions. On the other
hand, creation strategies focus more on creating new industries or transforming old ones
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through increasing capital availability, educating the workforce, and promoting technical
innovation. Creation strategy policies are more suited for cluster development.
Boeckelman (1991) also mentions that traditionalistic states usually only serve business
interests and do not focus on providing long-term gains of high-quality jobs, which as
described in more depth in Chapter 4, are provided by clusters.
The importance of political culture in addressing pertinent economic issues is
supported by two reasons, according to Boeckelman (1991). First, the political culture
concept itself is partly rooted in preferences and orientations toward political economy
therefore differing in the extent to which “they accept the ‘marketplace’ and economic
rationality as ordering principles for society” (p. 51). Second, political culture reveals
itself more in the behavior of political leaders having a stronger impact in complex policy
areas such as economic development. Therefore, political culture is useful to understand
the additional elements that impact cluster development and the role of government.
Combining the Literatures and Research Expectations
This research study combines cluster theory, network governance theory, and
political culture, utilizing the shipbuilding cluster 3 in the Gulf Coast as the unit of
analysis to better understand government’s potential and limitations through its role and
level of involvement in cluster development.
In an effort to explain competitive advantage rather than comparative advantage,
which used to be the leading explanatory indicator for economic growth, Porter (1990,
2000) identified a four-factor model that generates geographically concentrated “clusters”
that are more competitive and innovative than industries in “isolation.” He also discussed
3

The shipbuilding cluster was selected mainly because it is a mature cluster, involves an intrinsic
innovative industry (Low, 2009), and has a long history in the region.
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government’s role mainly under a context of influencing the factors through policies and
facilitating the cluster development and upgrading.
Enright (2003) identified different levels of government involvement while
Wickham (2005) pointed out that government’s role not only is endogenous to cluster
development but also varies depending on the development stage of the cluster itself and
can play a more advanced role facilitating the development and upgrading of the cluster
(Porter, 2000). Furthermore, Su and Hung (2009) concluded that a cluster’s origin,
institutional context, and history determine the strength of its networks and linkages. In
addition, several authors argue that linkages and relationships are critical for a cluster to
upgrade, and these can be enhanced and strengthened through public policies (Esser et
al., 1995; Humphrey & Schmitz, 2000; Messner, 1997; Pietrobelli & Rabellotti, 2004;
Schmitz, 1995).
According to multiple network governance authors (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Feiock,
2007; Frederickson, 1999; Frederickson & Matkin, 2005; Provan & Kenis, 2008; Provan
& Milward, 2001; Visser, 2004), not only does this theory describe and systematically
explain linkages and relationships among different public actors as well as between
private and public players, but this theory is also shown to have a major role regarding
economic development (Agranoff and McGuire, 1998; Humphrey & Schmitz, 2000).
Furthermore and from an organizational theory perspective, cluster and network
governance theories have a common denominator: both describe networks at play.
Networks are a different form of organizations since they are neither market nor
hierarchical in nature (Podolny & Page, 1998; Powell, 1990; Scott, 1981). Bernat (1999)
argued that although clusters and networks are conceptually different primarily because
industrial clusters rely heavily on proximity while networks do not, they often go
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together. Therefore, network governance theory is a good and useful framework within
which to understand the linkages and relationships not only within a cluster but also
among different public administration institutions.
Building on these literatures, three questions remain: (1) what explains the extent
of cluster-based policies; (2) what level of involvement is expected from government;
and (3) how can network governance theory be incorporated in this relationship between
cluster theory and government’s role? In an attempt to address these questions and to fill
the gap between cluster theory and government’s role, Miller’s (2006) model was tested
holding the market model, evolutionary economics, civic culture, and social and cultural
identity constant since the region where the shipbuilding cluster is located has a
traditionalistic political culture. The relationships between the network governance
moderator, political/institutional context, and the extent of cluster-based policies were
analyzed and tested.
Since political culture is partly rooted in orientations toward political economy
(Elazar, 1984), the assumption is made that the structural factors component variables
(market model, evolutionary economics, and civic culture) are equally affected by the
traditionalistic political culture. The five levels of government involvement in cluster
development identified by Enright (2003) were also utilized to provide a better
understanding of government’s role that goes beyond influencing factors and delves more
into the advanced role government plays in helping the cluster upgrade.
However, the traditionalistic political culture presents some challenges for clusterbased economic development as well as public administration from both a
political/institutional context as well as from the level of involvement. Elazar (1984)
argued that traditionalistic states view the role of government as necessary only to
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maintain the status quo, and thus, economic growth and development is the responsibility
of the elites and not of government.
This limited role leads to bureaucracies that are not trusted and are not as
developed as bureaucracies in other political cultures. Boeckelman (1991) found that
traditionalistic states take a more “passive” strategy regarding economic development
focusing more on maintaining existent industries and lowering tax rates and/or labor costs
rather than a more “active” role creating or transforming old industries, creating a tension
for what is necessary in network governance and cluster theory.
In summary, Table 6 shows the research expectations for each theory discussed
previously based on the following characteristics of development policies in a
traditionalistic political culture (Boeckelman, 1991; Elazar, 1984; Lieske, 1993):
•

Role is to maintain social order and the status quo; bureaucracies not as
developed or trusted

•

Elites are responsible for economic development

•

Pursue maintenance/attraction strategies rather than creation strategies
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Table 6

Summary of Research Expectations

Theory

Authors

Role of
Government

- Enright (2003)
- Wickham (2005)
- Su & Hung (2009)

Miller’s Model

Network
Governance

- Miller (2006)

- Agranoff & McGuire (1998)
- Frederickson (1999)
- Provan & Milward (2001)
- Provan & Kenis, (2008)
- Ansell & Gash, (2008)

Expectations
- Ranging from non-existent to
catalytic; perhaps supportive but
definitely not directive or
interventionist
- Cluster origin more than likely
spontaneous rather than policy-driven
- Private sector led with regimes,
growth machines, and civic
entrepreneurs very engaged
- Tax structure not favorable for
cluster-based economic development
- Elected officials with no regional
perspective and long-term vision
- Weak institutional arrangements
- Professionalism focused on
maintaining/recruiting; somewhat
favorable for cluster-based ED
- Weak informal/formal linkages and
interlocal agreements
- Little or no decentralization
- High transaction costs
- Starting conditions not favorable
- Administrative conjunction nonexistent or very informal
- Shared participant network
governance form

As shown in Table 6, political culture rests on the crossroads of understanding
government’s influence in each of the four factors, the level of government involvement
in cluster development, the shape of the political/institutional context that in turn explains
the extent of cluster-based policies, and the degree to which network governance can
achieve its full potential. The findings from this study will provide valuable information
to better understand the complex role public administration can and should play in cluster
development, especially in a mature and “old” cluster such as shipbuilding.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
Based on the literature reviewed, this section discusses some hypotheses related to
the role of public administration in cluster-based economic development strategies. The
methodology utilized to gather the data, test the hypotheses, and select the industrial
cluster is also discussed in this section. Utilizing Miller’s (2006) model as a framework,
the network governance structure (private versus public sector-led economic
development) is the independent variable; the political/institutional predictors is the
intervening variable; and the dependent variable is the extent of shipbuilding clusterbased economic development. Because the shipbuilding cluster is in a mature stage, a
component of the semi-structured interview instrument will focus on gathering some
insight on the cluster itself and not only on government’s role.
Industrial Cluster Selection
The shipbuilding cluster in the Gulf Coast was selected as the industrial cluster
for four main reasons. First, after conducting a local moran spatial correlation analysis of
location quotients, 4 the shipbuilding industry clustered in two different regions of the
Gulf Coast. The location quotient is the ratio of the percent employed or establishments
in a region divided by the percent employed or establishments in the nation. The resulting
ratio, greater or equal to 1.25, shows an industry is “concentrated” in that particular
4

The 2007 County Business Patterns of the U.S. Census Bureau were used to obtain the number of
shipbuilding establishments (NAICS code 336611)
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region compared to the nation. According to Porter (2003), location quotient analysis can
be used to identify clusters.
Location quotients were then utilized to conduct LISA cluster maps in an effort to
identify spatial correlations and thus delimit the geographic scope of the cluster
(delimiting the geographic scope of a cluster is one of the main criticisms of cluster
theory: see Martin & Sunley, 2003). My research project makes the unique contribution
of using location quotients (based on number of establishments) in the spatial correlation
analysis rather than number of establishments or people employed. The regions identified
are two: South Louisiana and Alabama-Mississippi (see Figure 3). 5

Figure 3

Shipbuilding Clusters

5

Texas was not included, even though it also has a traditionalistic political culture, because of a lack of
funding.
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Second, the shipbuilding cluster is considered a traded cluster among three types:
traded, local, and resource-dependent (Porter, 2003). Traded clusters compete across
regions, can locate anywhere, and show a higher level of productivity and innovation
compared to the other two (Ketels, 2006). Thus, understanding government’s role in the
development of this particular cluster type is important. On the other hand, because only
shipbuilding establishments were utilized in the location quotient analysis used to
identify the cluster, the cluster is considered to have horizontal relationships since only
direct competitors (shipyards) were included in the location quotient analysis and not
buyers and suppliers. Remember that according to Enright (2003), vertical clusters
include relationships between buyers and suppliers, while horizontal clusters refer to
clusters with direct competitors.
Third, the shipbuilding cluster was present in three different states in the Gulf
Coast as mentioned above. Having three different states with the same political culture
(Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama) involved in the development and sustainability of
the same cluster should help understand better the role of public administration as well as
identify any similarities or differences. Moreover, although the political culture is similar
if not the same according to Elazar (1984) for each of the three states involved, perhaps
some differences in the degree and type of government involved exist, supporting
Enright’s (2003) argument.
Finally, the regions selected with shipbuilding clusters for this study are part of
what has been designated a “megaregion” by the National Committee for America 2050.
This committee comprises regional planners, scholars, and policymakers, and defines a
megaregion as a region linked by “interlocking economic systems, shared natural
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resources and ecosystems, and common transportation systems” (America 2050, 2009).
Their objective is to develop a framework to address the nation’s future growth.
Research Design and Validation
A collective case study research design was utilized since the study includes three
instrumental case studies, and understanding these particular cases will lead to a better
overall understanding of the topic (Stakes, 2003). Semi-structured interviews were
conducted in an effort to (1) allow the key informant to share his/her experience, (2) have
certain flexibility of taking the interview in the direction desired, and (3) encourage and
guide the conversation to mutual discovery (Neuman, 2006).
Descriptive questions were formulated to explore the setting and background,
while structural questions were formulated to gather specific data and placed into
previously defined categories 6 (Neuman, 2006). The previously defined categories
include cluster history, network governance, political/institutional predictors, and the
extent of cluster-based economic development policies.
Regarding external consistency, findings were triangulated conducting interviews
with different key informants related to the shipbuilding cluster such as city planners,
local economic developers, regional economic developers, government officials, and
leaders in the shipbuilding industry. An initial list of potential interviewees was compiled
from the most visible key players. Additional key informants were selected using a
snowball sampling technique. The results are only generalizable to the shipbuilding
cluster in the tri-state region (Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama) on the Gulf Coast.

6

For more information on the categories, please refer to Appendix A
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Model and Hypotheses
Miller’s (2006) framework attempts to understand the political/institutional
context to explain the variation in the extent of cluster-based economic development.
This study will operationalize the model in such a way to help understand the variation in
the extent of policies that helped develop and/or sustain the existent cluster. The cluster’s
stage of development will also be taken into consideration when analyzing the predictors,
factors, and moderators identified by Miller (2006). Figure 4 shows the model.

Figure 4

Research Model

H1: The higher the network governance score (more private sector driven), the higher the
extent of cluster-based economic development
H2: The higher the network governance score (more private sector driven), the higher the
political/institutional predictor score
H3: The higher the political/institutional predictor score, the higher the extent of clusterbased policies

43

Data Gathering
An application was submitted to the Institutional Review Board at Mississippi
State University since this research project dealt with human subjects. Once approval was
obtained, data was gathered utilizing a semi-structured interview conducted in person or
over the phone. All components were measured at the ordinal level in scales from 1 to 10.
The independent, intervening, and dependent constructed variables were measured by the
sum of their components at the ordinal level.
In an effort to triangulate the information gathered, key informants from three
different sectors were interviewed. Research related to economic development and the
shipbuilding industry was conducted, and an initial list of approximately 30 organizations
was compiled. After using the snowball sampling technique, the total number of
organizations contacted was 72. The total number of interviews conducted was 24. The
overall participation rate was 33.3%. These organizations included key leaders from
local/state government, regional chambers of commerce, local economic development
organizations, and shipbuilding establishments.
Although the sample size may seem small, the overall population is limited as
well. The limited size of the population is due to three main reasons. First, the number of
communities in the region selected with a high concentration of shipbuilding
establishments compared to the nation is not very large. Second, people who are
knowledgeable of both the industry and the political context within our research area
further limited the overall population. Third, of those contacted, only about a third
participated in the interview. Consistent efforts were made to increase the sample size
within the limited population.
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Operationalization and Data Coding
The network governance structure variable was measured by the following
components on a scale from 1 to 10: the strength level of regimes (question 2a–see
Appendix A), the engagement level of growth machines (question 2b–see Appendix A),
and the activity level of civic entrepreneurs (question 2c–see Appendix A) (Miller, 2006).
The scores obtained for each component were added up to obtain a constructed variable
called “network governance.” Because economic development is usually a joint effort, no
pure “private” or “public” driven network governance was expected. The closer the final
score was to 30 (the highest score possible), the closer it was to being purely private
sector driven. Similarly, the closer it was to 3 (the lowest score possible), the closer it
was to being purely public sector driven.
The political/institutional variable was measured by the following components
also on a scale from 1 to 10: local tax structure (question 3–see Appendix A), institutional
arrangements made easier (question 4–see Appendix A), economic development
perspectives of the local elected officials (question 5–see Appendix A), and
professionalization of the local economic development staff (question 6–see Appendix
A). A constructed variable called “political/institutional predictors” was obtained from
adding each of these four components together. The maximum score possible was 40 and
the minimum was 4.
Finally, the extent of cluster-based economic development policies was measured
by eleven components using a scale from 1 to 10. These components were obtained from
Porter (2000) and were asked in questions 7a through 7k (see Appendix A). The score
obtained from each component was added to obtain a constructed variable called “the
extent of cluster-based policies.” The maximum score possible was 110, while the
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minimum score possible was 11. Though face-to-face interviews were initially planned
for all interviews, some interviews were conducted over the phone because of the
participants’ busy schedules and the considerable time it took to reach the Gulf Coast
(about four and a half hours). Therefore, phone interviews for some participants seemed
more accommodating than face-to-face interviews. The disadvantages of phone
interviews include the lack of observing face gestures and facial expressions that also
convey valuable information. Nonetheless, both face-to-face and phone interviews were
conducted, recorded, and later transcribed. Table 7 shows a summary of the components
utilized and how the variables were constructed.
Table 7

Constructed Variables and Components

Components
 Regimes (reg)
 Growth Machines (grwmach)
 Civic Entrepreneurs (civent)
 Tax Structure (taxst)
 Inst. Arrangements (instarr)
 Elected Officials (eleoff)
 Professional Staff (edprof)
 Promotion (prom)
 Infrastructure (infra)
 Workforce (wrkfrc)
 Research (res)
 Programs (prog)
 Activities (act)
 Investment (inv)
 Suppliers (supp)
 Conferences (conf)
 Regulatory Standards (regstd)
 Trade Zones (trdzo)

Constructed Variable

Type

Network Governance (netgov)

Independent

Institutional Predictors (instpred)

Intervening

Extent of Cluster-Based Policies (cbpol)

Dependent

Data Analysis
The data gathered was analyzed using two approaches: qualitative and
quantitative. Two statistical methods were utilized in the latter approach to test the
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hypothesis, fine-tune the political/institutional model, and understand which government
policies have enhanced the model using Porter’s (2000) diamond.
In order to understand the cluster’s history and provide some context, qualitative
data gathered through the interviews was analyzed. NVivo 8 software was utilized to
code and analyze the responses obtained from the open-ended questions (questions 1, 1a,
1b, 8, and 9–see Appendix A). After each interview was transcribed, emerging themes
concerning the cluster’s history and impact in the region were identified. Once these
themes were identified, each interview response was coded based on those themes. The
findings are presented in Chapter 4.
Once the sample was weighted (refer to participant breakdown and weighting
section below for information on how the sample was weighted), two different statistical
tests were utilized to test the hypothesis, fine-tune the model, and understand how public
policy within Porter’s diamond model has enhanced the cluster. These tests were
conducted using the SPSS (version 18 for Windows) statistical software.
First, Goodman and Kruskal’s Gamma crosstab analysis was conducted. This
analysis measures the strength of the relationship between variables measured at the
ordinal level (Sheskin, 2007). All components and constructed variables were recoded
into high/low. High refers to values above the mean and low to values below the mean.
This analysis shows if the strength and direction of the relationship accepts or rejects the
hypotheses. Only two groups were used because of the limited size of the sample.
In addition to the gamma crosstab analysis, Pearson’s r Correlation Coefficient
was utilized to better understand the strength and direction of the relationships as well as
the degree of correlation between the component variables within the model. This
analysis will show which individual component variables have significant relationships
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within the model, resulting in an improved political/institutional model. These two
statistical analyses were selected mainly because of the sample size.
These two different analyses were conducted in an effort to better uncover
correlations and relationships within the model. If a particular variable showed as having
a statistically significant relationship in both analyses, it was considered as having a
major impact on the dependent variable. Similarly, if only one of the analyses showed a
statistically significant relationship, the variable was considered to have only a partial
impact on the dependent variable.
Finally, each of the eleven components of the cluster-based policies was grouped
into each of Porter’s four factors. Once the components were grouped by factors, their
means were compared using student’s t-test to see if there were any statistically
significant differences between the grouped cluster-based policies. Table 8 shows a
summary of the statistical analyses utilized.
Table 8

Summary of Analyses Utilized

Cluster History & Impact
Hypotheses Testing
Fine-Tune Model
Cluster Enhancement

Approach
Qualitative
Quantitative
Quantitative
Quantitative

Technique
Theme Emergence
Gamma Crosstab
Gamma Crosstab, Pearson’s r
Student’s t-test

Participant Breakdown and Weighting
The overall participation rate was 33% completing a total of 24 interviews out of
72 possible. Figure 5 shows a breakdown of the participants by type. As shown, almost
80% of the participants were from the government and nonprofit sectors. Only 20% of
the participants were from the industry sector. Although consistent efforts were made to
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interview more representatives of the industry, like rescheduling the interview multiple
times and offering even the phone interview option, these were not successful

20.8

41.7

Nonprofit
Government
Industry

37.5

Figure 5

Participant Breakdown by Sector

Since only a third of the overall population was interviewed, an understanding of
how representative the sample is of the overall population is warranted. Table 5 below
shows a breakdown by state, level, and type for both the overall population as well as the
sample obtained. Keep in mind that the sample size for the statistical analysis was of 23
rather than 24, since data obtained from one interview was only useful for the cluster’s
description, history, and government involvement.
Based on Table 9, both Louisiana and Alabama were underrepresented in the
sample. This was the case for one main reason: participants from Mississippi were more
likely to participate because of my affiliation with Mississippi State University. On the
other hand, several participants from the other two states declined to participate for the
49

same reason, arguing that the states compete for the same industry establishments. This is
interesting since cluster “players” not only compete but also need to cooperate.
Nonetheless and even though it was stressed that the region was considered as a whole
and that all information would be kept confidential, increasing the sample size from
Louisiana and Alabama was unsuccessful.
Table 9

Population and Sample Breakdown by State, Level, and Type

State
Alabama
Mississippi
Louisiana
Type
Nonprofit
Government
Industry
Level
Local
Regional
State
Total

Population

-17
31
24
-26
21
25
-62
5
5

% Pop

-23.6
43.1
33.3
-36.1
29.2
34.7
-86.1
6.9
6.9

Sample

72

-4
14
5
-10
9
4
-19
1
3

% Sample

-17.4
60.9
21.7
-43.5
39.1
17.4
-82.6
4.3
13.0

Weight
1.3576
0.7073
1.5333
0.8305
0.7453
1.9965
1.0424
1.5972
0.5324

23

Industry representatives were underrepresented for two reasons. First, only top
executives possessed sufficient knowledge regarding their industry and its relationship
with government. However, these individuals are extremely busy and therefore it was
hard to convince them to allocate an hour of their time to this research. Second, a lack of
contacts within the industry itself proved sufficient to undermine their share of the
sample. Although efforts were made to contact industry representatives utilizing
economic development organizations and/or government officials, their response was
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similar, arguing a lack of time and/or interest to participate in the research study.
Nonetheless, two of the major shipyards in the region did participate.
Finally, regional organizations were underrepresented in the sample simply
because they declined to participate. The reasons for these include the affiliation with
Mississippi State University; and therefore, they perceived they would not benefit at all
from the findings of this research. Efforts were made unsuccessfully to explain that the
region as a whole was the focus of the research.
The sample obtained was weighted only by type instead of all three sectors shown
in Table 5 for two main reasons. First, there was no need to weight by state since all three
states have the same political culture (traditionalistic). Therefore, there was no theoretical
reason to weight by state. Second, the majority of policies and incentives are
implemented by the state, thus eliminating the need to weight by level including local and
regional. However, the need to weight by type was important for one main reason:
providing the study more validity triangulating with the three different types discussed.
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CHAPTER IV
CLUSTER HISTORY
This chapter is divided into five sections. Section one provides a description of
the cluster including quantitative data such as employment and number of establishments.
Section 2 discusses the main themes that emerged from discussing the cluster history.
Section 3 looks at the role of government as perceived by the participants. Section 4
discusses the impacts the cluster has had on both urban and rural communities along the
Gulf Coast. To conclude, section 5 presents the perceived impacts of Northrop Grumman
on the development of the cluster.
Cluster Description
The shipbuilding cluster in the Gulf Coast region is an old cluster. 7 Shipbuilding
activities have existed in the Gulf Coast area ranging from the first European settlers to at
least 200 years ago. However, according to the Department of Transportation’s Maritime
Administration, the national shipbuilding industry in the nation is declining.
Based on figures obtained from the DOT Maritime Administration, between 1982
and 2005 there was a decline from 110 major shipyards in the nation to 82, while the
workforce decreased from 112,500 to 46,300. The major losses took place in the East
Coast region, which suffered a decline of 34% of major shipyards from 41 in 1982 to 27
in 2005 and a dramatic decrease of almost 97% of its workforce from a little over 63,000
in 1982 to 19,000 in 2005. On the other hand, the Gulf Coast region suffered a loss of
7

For more information please refer to the following section: Cluster History
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only 6% regarding major shipyards from 33 in 1982 to 31 in 2005 and a loss of 20.5%
regarding its workforce from almost 23,000 in 1982 to a little more than 18,000 in 2005.
Thus, the Gulf Coast obtained a larger share of the national shipbuilding “pie.”
The major shipyard in the region has a fairly long history as well. The current
Northrop Grumman shipyard began as Ingalls Shipbuilding Corporation in 1938 in
Pascagoula, Mississippi. By 1961, Ingalls Shipbuilding Corporation was purchased by
Litton Industries, and in 1968, Litton Industries expanded the facility to conduct modular
construction, earning the name of “shipyard of the future.” In 2001, Northrop Grumman
acquired Litton industries (Northrop Grumman, 2009). Starting in the 2000s decade,
other major shipyards either moved into the area or bought existent shipyards such as
Austal in Alabama, Bollinger in Louisiana, and VT Halter in Mississippi. See Figure 6
for a descriptive timeline (not intended to be comprehensive).

Figure 6

Shipbuilding in the Gulf Coast Timeline

One of the most used indicators to describe clusters is job change. Table 10 shows
the percent change in total number of shipbuilding (NAICS 336611) jobs between 2003
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and 2008 between the nation and the Gulf Coast region. 8 The U.S. in general had an
increase in shipbuilding jobs of 15.7% between 2003 and 2008 from 91,786 to 106,210
jobs compared to an 11.2% increase in the region from 26,977 to a little over 30,000.
Within the region, St. John the Baptist Parish in Louisiana had the highest percent
increase with 244%, followed by Harrison County in Mississippi with 121% between
2003 and 2008. On the other hand, Plaquemines Parish in Louisiana had a decrease of
41.8% between 2003 and 2008, followed by Iberia Parish, also in Louisiana.
Table 10

2003-2008 Percent Change in Shipbuilding Jobs
Area
Mobile, AL
Iberia, LA
Jefferson, LA
Lafourche, LA
Orleans, LA
Plaquemines, LA
St. Bernard, LA
St. John the Baptist, LA
St. Mary, LA
St. Tammany, LA
Terrebonne, LA
Harrison, MS
Jackson, MS
Region
United States

FIPS
01097
22045
22051
22057
22071
22075
22087
22095
22101
22103
22109
28047
28059

2003 Jobs
1,936
1,025
6,845
1,582
363
297
16
18
1,206
269
1,193
576
11,651
26,977
91,786

2008 Jobs
3,836
707
6,056
1,446
371
173
31
62
1,293
262
1,875
1,274
12,617
30,003
106,210

Per. Ch.
+98.1
-31.0
-11.5
-8.6
+2.2
-41.8
+93.8
+244.4
+7.2
-2.6
+57.2
+121.2
+8.3
+11.2
+15.7

Source: Economic Modeling Specialists, Inc. 3Q 2010 Complete Employment

In addition to analyzing job change, Table 11 shows the percent change in
shipbuilding establishments (NAICS 663311) between 2003 and 2008. As shown, the
nation overall had a 9.5% increase from 620 shipbuilding establishments in 2003 to 679
8

This region was identified based on the LISA cluster map results used to select the shipbuilding cluster
(refer to Chapter 3–Methodology). The region includes the following counties and parishes: Mobile County
in Alabama; Harrison and Jackson counties in Mississippi; Iberia, Jefferson, Lafourche, Orleans,
Plaquemines, St. Bernard, St. John the Baptist, St. Mary, St. Tammany, and Terrebonne parishes in
Louisiana.
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in 2008. The region where the research took place also experienced an increase of 5.9%
from 101 shipbuilding establishments in 2003 to 107 in 2008. The total number of
shipbuilding establishments within the region accounted for 16.2% of those in the nation
compared to 15.7% in 2008. In other words, the region had a slightly lower share in 2008
than it had in 2003.
Within the region analyzed, Iberia Parish in Louisiana had the largest increase
with 33.3%, followed by Lafourche Parish in Louisiana and Jackson County in
Mississippi with 22.2%. Interesting to note is that Iberia Parish in Louisiana had one of
the major declines in jobs during the same period. On the other hand, St. Tammany
Parish in Louisiana experienced the largest decline with 50%, followed by Jefferson
Parish in Louisiana with a 26.7% decline.
Table 11

2003-2008 Percent Change in Shipbuilding Establishments
Area
Mobile, AL
Iberia, LA
Jefferson, LA
Lafourche, LA
Orleans, LA
Plaquemines, LA
St. Bernard, LA
St. John the Baptist, LA
St. Mary, LA
St. Tammany, LA
Terrebonne, LA
Harrison, MS
Jackson, MS
Region
United States

FIPS
01097
22045
22051
22057
22071
22075
22087
22095
22101
22103
22109
28047
28059

Source: Census County Business Patterns

2003 Est
24
6
15
9
8
1
4
1
11
2
10
1
9
101
620

2008 Est
28
8
11
11
9
1
3
1
11
1
11
1
11
107
679

Per. Ch.
+16.7
+33.3
-26.7
+22.2
+12.5
+0.0
-25.0
+0.0
+0.0
-50.0
+10.0
+0.0
+22.2
+5.9
+9.5

The following two tables show the location quotient of both jobs and
establishments in shipbuilding compared to the nation. As discussed in the previous
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chapter, location quotients provide information on how concentrated a particular industry
is in a region compared to the nation. A location quotient higher than 1.25 indicates an
industry is concentrated in that particular region. Tables 8 and 9 show the location
quotients calculated using jobs and establishment data.
As shown in Table 12, the shipbuilding industry became more concentrated in 6
out of the 13 counties/parishes in the region between 2003 and 2008. Likewise, the
industry became less concentrated but still significantly above the 1.25 threshold in 7 out
of the 13 counties in the region. Overall, the region became more concentrated going
from an LQ of 36.87 compared to the nation in 2003 to an LQ of 38.99 in 2008. By 2008,
all counties/parishes in the region had an LQ above 1.25. Jackson County in Mississippi
(home to the Northrop Grumman shipyard) was the county with the highest LQ of 317.82
in 2008, while Orleans Parish in Louisiana had the lowest LQ with 2.71 in 2008.
Table 12

Shipbuilding Jobs Location Quotients
Area
Mobile, AL
Iberia, LA
Jefferson, LA
Lafourche, LA
Orleans, LA
Plaquemines, LA
St. Bernard, LA
St. John the Baptist, LA
St. Mary, LA
St. Tammany, LA
Terrebonne, LA
Harrison, MS
Jackson, MS
Region
United States

FIPS
01097
22045
22051
22057
22071
22075
22087
22095
22101
22103
22109
28047
28059

2003 LQ Jobs
16.46
48.17
45.22
55.22
2.07
27.12
1.21
1.92
67.50
5.09
39.49
8.36
339.74
36.87
1.00

2008 LQ Jobs
26.87
26.77
38.61
39.70
2.71
15.51
3.49
4.96
63.26
3.82
50.14
17.78
317.82
38.99
1.00

Source: Economic Modeling Specialists, Inc. 3Q 2010 Complete Employment
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On the other hand, Table 13 shows the location quotients based on the number of
establishments compared to the nation. As shown, 9 out of the 13 counties/parishes in the
region became more concentrated regarding shipbuilding establishments in 2008
compared to 2003 while 4 counties/parishes became “less” concentrated although their
LQ values exceeded the 1.25 threshold significantly. Furthermore, as was the case with
shipbuilding jobs, the region overall also became more concentrated in shipbuilding
establishments compared to the nation. As observed with jobs LQ, all counties/parishes in
the region had an LQ higher than the 1.25 threshold.
Table 13

Shipbuilding Establishments Location Quotients
Area
Mobile, AL
Iberia, LA
Jefferson, LA
Lafourche, LA
Orleans, LA
Plaquemines, LA
St. Bernard, LA
St. John the Baptist, LA
St. Mary, LA
St. Tammany, LA
Terrebonne, LA
Harrison, MS
Jackson, MS
Region
United States

FIPS
01097
22045
22051
22057
22071
22075
22087
22095
22101
22103
22109
28047
28059

Source: Census County Business Patterns

2003 LQ Est
30.65
43.36
13.84
57.42
8.95
15.73
39.87
18.25
94.16
4.64
41.27
2.62
46.31
21.76
1.00

2008 LQ Est
33.93
51.71
10.17
63.05
12.30
16.83
55.33
15.25
86.90
1.88
41.59
2.64
51.57
22.95
1.00

The loss of both shipbuilding establishments and jobs between 2003-2008 for
some counties/parishes in the region analyzed may be a result of mergers and acquisitions
and/or of shipyard companies moving to other areas within the region, especially after
Hurricane Katrina, such as Trinity Yachts, which moved from New Orleans in Louisiana
to Gulf Port in Mississippi, or out of the region altogether.
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Finally and based on the interviews conducted for this research and discussed
more in depth throughout this chapter, Figure 7 shows the major players and institutions
identified in the shipbuilding cluster analyzed. Important to note is that this is not a
comprehensive listing of the players and institutions. Rather, the players and institutions
as well as their linkages were inferred based on the interviews with the participants.

Figure 7

Major Players and Institutions of the Gulf Coast Shipbuilding Cluster

Note that the linkages between state and local governments with the shipbuilders
are not direct. Rather, the connections are indirect via community colleges, the Gulf
States Shipbuilders Consortium, and shipbuilding R&D centers. Physical assets such as
roads, sewer, facilities, and other cluster-related infrastructure are not shown in the figure
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but also indirectly link the shipbuilders with state and local governments. The only direct
connection between government, specifically the federal government, and the
shipbuilding cluster is through the military market niches of the cluster.
The major players and institutions that have direct linkages to the shipbuilders
include community colleges, the Gulf States Shipbuilding Consortium, the suppliers and
related industries (this category includes economic development organizations as well as
federal regulators such as OSHA), and shipbuilding R&D centers. All other players and
institutions have indirect linkages to the shipbuilding cluster. However, their roles are
critical. Also, the only player that has linkages to all other players and institutions is the
Gulf States Shipbuilding Consortium. Organizations such as the consortium are clear
evidence that a cluster is mature and in a better position to upgrade (Porter, 2003).
To conclude, without a doubt the shipbuilding cluster in the region analyzed is a
mature cluster. Though the region continues to grow in both the number of shipbuilding
jobs and the number of shipbuilding establishments, the maturity of the cluster may
become a limitation in the midterm regarding future growth of the cluster. Some evidence
for this can be seen with individual counties/parishes within the region losing jobs and/or
shipbuilding establishments. Nonetheless, the shipbuilding cluster in the Gulf Coast is a
major employer in the area and of critical importance to the well-being of the region.
Cluster History
According to Porter (1998), the birth of some clusters may be rooted in their
history. After analyzing the data gathered, several interesting themes emerged when
asking the participants about the history of the shipbuilding cluster in the region. First, a
long history characterizes the shipbuilding cluster in the region. About 50% of the
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participants mentioned that the cluster has a long history in the region. This long history
ranges from when the first European settlers arrived to at least 200 years ago.
Without a doubt, the shipbuilding cluster is a mature cluster. An important sign
that a cluster is maturing is the emergence of associations tailored specifically to the
cluster (Porter, 2000). In this particular case, the Gulf States Shipbuilders Consortium is
clear evidence of this maturation. This long history is complemented and perhaps a
consequence of what the majority of the participants agreed gives this cluster a
comparative advantage: its proximity to a large body of water, the Gulf of Mexico, as
well as the availability of deep water rivers and channels.
Another important theme that emerged is that the shipbuilding cluster in the
region is a resilient cluster. According to one participant, “To give you an idea, in the
80’s there were something like 200 or so major shipyards in the country and over the last
two decades there are now something like 80 major yards. That’s a big change in the
number of yards. But I would like to point out this that in 1982 for instance the Gulf
Coast had about 33 yards and in 2005 it had 31 yards so even though it has lost some,
lost some employees, I think generally its piece of the pie … has managed holding its own
and if anything its gotten a larger piece of the shrinking pie.”
Some of the reasons why the participants believed the cluster has been “holding”
or even increasing its share of the pie is the fact that throughout its development, the
cluster has identified and marketed specific niches. In other words, the cluster is
constantly evolving. The majority of shipyards in the region do not compete with each
other locally. Rather, they have identified their own niche. These niches are military,
oilfield services, and fishing activities.
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Similarly, this diversification of its niches has allowed the shipbuilding cluster in
the region to rely not only on the U.S. economy but also on the global economy. This is a
perfect example of “competition” but also cooperation making the industrial cluster more
competitive globally. Even though the cluster serves different niches, they all share
research institutions, government incentives, and utilize the same workforce pool, which
in turn has existed for several generations. See Figure 8 for the relationships between
participants and themes identified.

Figure 8

Cluster History Components by Participant

Notes: Each rectangle is a participant with a randomly assigned number; each of the three
components of the cluster history is included in the circles
Each of the major themes identified regarding the cluster’s history are shown in
Figure 8 and are highly correlated as perceived by the participants. Therefore, the cluster
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history can be well understood when considering these three components. Also, Figure 8
shows that all but three participants referred to these components (diverse niches, long
history, and geographic location) when describing the history of the cluster.
Furthermore, Table 14 shows the breakdown of the cluster’s history components
by sector. As observed, 39.9% of government respondents, 48.9% of industry, and 20.4%
of nonprofits identified a long history component. More than half of industry respondents
(51%) identified a diverse niches component, followed by 41.7% of nonprofits and
34.2% of government participants.
Table 14

Cluster History Components by Sector
Sector
Diverse Niches
Geographic Location
Long History
N

Notes: Columns add to 100%.

Government
34.2%
25.7%
39.9%
10

Industry
51.0%
0.0%
48.9%
6

Nonprofit
41.7%
37.7%
20.4%
14

Similarly, 37.7% of nonprofit respondents identified a geographic location
component followed by a quarter of government respondents (25.7%). Interestingly,
industry respondents did not mention the geographic location as a component when
discussing the cluster’s history.
In summary, the cluster has a long history in the region, it is constantly evolving
and identifying new niches, and its geographic location is one of the main reasons why
the cluster emerged. All of these findings support Porter’s (1998) argument that the birth
of a cluster may be rooted in historical circumstances. Therefore, it can be concluded that
this cluster has a long history likely because of its geographic location.
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Role of Government
It is clear from this study that there is no doubt among those interviewed that the
role of government 9 in the development and sustainability of this cluster has been very
important. To better understand government’s role, the participants were asked to choose
from a series of roles government can play in developing or aiding a cluster (Enright,
2003). These include non-existent (there are no cluster-based economic policies in place),
catalytic (government arranges for parties to come together but its involvement is
limited), supportive (in addition to getting groups together, government provides clusterspecific investments in infrastructure and education/training and plays a passive role),
directive (government implements cluster programs to reshape local economies), and
interventionist (in addition to implementing cluster programs, government makes major
decisions regarding the cluster, rather than the private sector; provides substantial
subsidies, protections, or regulations; and has major ownership and/or control of the
cluster).
Government is perceived as overwhelmingly supportive of the shipbuilding
cluster as Table 15 shows (as expected from states with traditionalistic political culture).
To a lesser extent, government is also perceived as playing a catalytic and/or directive
role. However, the role of government has not been static over time as argued by
Wickham (2005). Some participants mentioned that during different times throughout its
history, the role of government has ranged from catalytic to directive. Similarly, the role
of government varies depending on how it interacts with the cluster.

9

An important distinction must be made between federal and state/local government’s role for the military
niche (see the history of the cluster for other niches). The federal government’s role is more from a
customer perspective, generating demand for warships. On the other hand, state/local governments played a
more traditional role of supporting the industry. As one participant put it, “I think it’s almost one of these
things where the biggest customer of course is the federal government so everything the federal government
determines as far as shipbuilding has an implication on the Gulf Coast...”
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Table 15

Government’s Role
Role
Non-Existent
Catalytic
Supportive
Directive
Interventionist

No. Participants
0
2
19
2
1

% Participants
0.0%
8.3%
79.1%
8.3%
4.1%

Notes: Percentage column may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

For example, some participants perceived local/state government to play a
catalytic role funding and supporting local economic development organizations. These
organizations in turn would attract and/or retain industry strengthening the cluster. In this
example, government was perceived to have played more of a catalytic role at the
beginning, shifting to a more supportive role later on.
Another good example of how critical the role of government has been and how it
shifts depending on the context was when Litton Industries, which would later become
Northrop Grumman, was expanding during the 1960s. The State of Mississippi played a
key role issuing industrial development bonds to raise the capital needed for the
expansion. As a participant mentioned, “if you think about it only in that sense had the
state of Mississippi not actually change its constitution, up until then political
subdivisions (counties, cities) had historically been allowed to put up its full faith in
credit to borrow money for industrial development, it had never before been done at the
state level, not in Mississippi or any of the other states. So, Mississippi was a pioneer in
the process of state-backed industrial development bonds for industrial development.”
Local/state governments have also played a crucial role in developing key
infrastructure that has helped the shipbuilding cluster develop and strengthen. According
to a key informant, “it was a local government initiative to build this seaway back in the
1950’s looking forward into the future.” Furthermore, when asked about the role of
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government regarding the cluster’s development a public official stated, “I think you
have to frame the question like: how do we the public interface with the shipyard? And
that’s like a family. I would describe that as being a family. They are our family. If they
need something from us we try to make it available to them. If we need something from
them, they try to make it available to us.”
Government’s role has been very supportive regarding workforce training as well.
Not only do they support these efforts but they also engage in partnerships to benefit the
industry. As one participant from the industry mentioned, “I think it’s a great partnership
between shipbuilding, the community college, and the state workforce development, and
the WIN [workforce investment network] job center. Those are great partners and of
course the WIN job center and the community colleges state and federal funding. They
really do a good job for us and we just would have a hard time without them, community
colleges in particular.”
Government’s role, both at the local and state level, is overwhelmingly perceived
as supportive. Table 16 shows the percent of participants by sector (government,
nonprofit, industry) and their perceptions regarding the role government has played. As
observed, government playing a supportive role is consistent across all three sectors;
100% of industry participants perceived government as supportive followed by 89.5% of
government participants and 69.4% of nonprofit participants. Interesting to note is that
the nonprofit sector had somewhat of a variety regarding government’s role but a
supportive role standing out as the most perceived role.
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Table 16

Government’s Role by Sector
Sector
Non-Existent
Catalytic
Supportive
Directive
Interventionist
N

Government
0.0%
10.5%
89.5%
0.0%
0.0%
8

Notes: Columns add to 100%.

Industry
0.0%
0.0%
100.0%
0.0%
0.0%
4

Nonprofit
0.0%
2.6%
69.4%
19.4%
8.3%
12

Federal government plays a major dual role as well. On one hand, the federal
government generates an important share of the demand for warships, directly impacting
the military niche. Although some shipyards in the region also build warships for foreign
governments, such as VT Halter, the great majority of warships are built for the U.S.
federal government. Therefore, spending priorities in navy vessels defined in Washington
affect the cluster.
On the other hand, the federal government is a main player regarding policies that
may affect the cluster. As a participant put it, “But I think the greatest challenges are at
the federal level. The policies that are made in Washington impact employment, impact
the ability for unions to organize, and impact air and water quality. Those are the real
threats to shipbuilding.” Or as another participant put it, “Our greatest threat is
Washington, DC. As you think about the regulatory side … DC has got the blessing or the
curse. Some of their regulatory pieces are actually helping stimulate our economy but
there are other pieces that put us at risk.”
Although local/state government’s role was perceived as supportive, this role is
dynamic and defined by two main factors. First, there is a specific time period or context
during which government gets involved to either serve as a catalyst or to support the
industry. The second main factor is a specific need that the industry has in which
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government can help. In this particular case, it can be developing key infrastructure or
improving the capacity of its community college system to provide timely and efficient
workforce training to the industry. Understanding these two factors provides a clearer
picture of a dynamic government’s role in the development of the shipbuilding cluster in
the region. Furthermore, federal government plays a major and dual role. On one side,
federal government serves as the main client regarding the military niche. On the other
hand, federal government policies impact the industrial cluster, either enhancing its
competitiveness or hindering it.
Impact of the Cluster in Rural Communities
Since the major shipyards in the region are located in the urban coastal
counties/parishes, we asked the participants to discuss the impacts of this industrial
cluster on rural communities to the north of the coast. According to the 2003 Office of
Management and Budget core-based statistical definitions, metropolitan counties/parishes
are those with an urban core of at least 50,000 residents or 25% or more of its workforce
working in a neighboring metropolitan county. Micropolitan counties, on the other hand,
are counties/parishes with a core of at least 10,000 up to 49,999 residents. Finally,
noncore counties/parishes are those with no core of at least 10,000 residents. Urban
counties/parishes include those defined as metropolitan counties, while rural
counties/parishes include those defined as micropolitan and noncore by this typology.
The majority of participants mentioned that the impact of the cluster on the area
has been positive. Within these impacts, several components were identified. First and
foremost is the fact that the shipbuilding cluster provides a significant number of quality
jobs with great benefits to both urban and rural residents. As noted by one participant,
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“because the shipyard workers live all over the region, it is not exclusive to rural or
urban, they are everywhere.” Also, some key informants mentioned that many residents
from rural communities commute long distances to work in the shipyards: “I found out
we got folks from Waynesboro, folks from Laurel, folks from Meridian that actually drive
down and work in the shipyards and then go back home.” 10
Furthermore, the shipbuilding cluster provides quality jobs to certain retirees. This
key informant stated, “We have military installations down here where people served in
the armed forces that it gives us the quality workforce and the work ethic that you don’t
have in a lot of places. These people retire from the military in their early 50’s and they
want another career, something to do. This high tech high skill well paid jobs in the
shipbuilding cluster provides those jobs for people too so they don’t have to leave and go
somewhere else.”
From a workforce development perspective, the shipbuilding cluster has
challenged community colleges to come up with innovative training programs geared
toward high school graduates. These apprentice-type programs have raised the bar
regarding workforce development efforts. According to one participant, “it strengthened
them [community colleges] because it challenged them to do these apprentice type
programs.”
Shipbuilding has also had a positive impact on the quality of life of both urban
and rural communities. Jobs related to shipbuilding offer good pay and benefits providing
a venue by which workers can raise their quality of life. Furthermore, the rural
commuters expect more of their home communities. As this participant mentioned, “It is
10

The city of Meridian is 150 miles north or three and half hours driving time of Pascagoula, MS (home of
the Northrop Grumman shipyard) and 130 miles or two hours forty minutes northwest of Mobile, AL
(home of Austal shipbuilding) for example.
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making us step up to the plate with quality of life issues because people no longer just
want to just say they sleep here. They want to be able to spend all their off time here. So
that’s making us step up to the plate with better parks and things of that nature.”
On a similar note, shipbuilding enhances the quality of life by sponsoring events
and contributes to local and regional fundraising efforts. As this participant put it,
“Regarding quality of life, I think shipbuilding has given back to the community. They
sponsor events, they contribute to fundraising, both regional and local. Depending on
who’s at the helm of the shipbuilding entities, some more than others, but overall they
have been supportive of local fund raising efforts and local social events.”
A breakdown of the positive impacts by sector is shown in Table 17. As observed,
the view that the cluster has a positive impact, in the form of providing quality jobs in the
region holds across all three sectors with 85% of nonprofit respondents mentioning
quality jobs followed by almost 80% of industry participants and almost half of
government participants (48%). Therefore, all three sectors perceive the cluster as having
a positive impact providing mainly quality jobs as well as enhancing the quality of life.
Table 17

Positive Impacts Breakdown by Sector
Sector
Community Colleges
Quality Jobs
Quality of Life
Retired People
N

Notes: Columns add to 100%.

Government
7.8%
48.0%
31.7%
12.4%
12

Industry
5.0%
79.4%
15.5%
0.0%
8

Nonprofit
0.0%
85.4%
14.5%
0.0%
9

Negative impacts were mentioned as well. Some of these negative impacts
include the risk of flooding and shutting down whenever a natural disaster strikes. This in
turn causes a displacement of workers that may decide to leave the area and take their
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skills with them. Similarly, some key informants mentioned that because of natural
disasters and the demand of the industry itself, some communities are struggling to
provide housing for shipyard workers. Another negative impact discussed was regarding
environmental damage. However, this negative impact is not directly related to
shipbuilding. Rather, this negative impact was associated with one of the shipbuilding
cluster niches: oilfield and services.
The shipbuilding cluster has a positive impact in both urban as well as rural
communities. These positive impacts include quality jobs drawing workers from both
urban and rural communities, improving workforce-training efforts of community
colleges, and enhancing the quality of life in three ways. First, it exerts a pressure on
rural communities to offer better services so commuters can spend quality off time at
their home communities. Second, shipbuilding gives back to communities, sponsoring
local events and contributing to fundraising, which in turn enhance the quality of life.
Third, shipbuilding offers well-paying jobs and good benefits that improve the quality of
life of many families.
Impact of Northrop Grumman
The Northrop Grumman shipyard in Pascagoula is the 800-pound gorilla in the
region employing approximately 11,000 people. Because the federal government awards
the majority of the contracts obtained by the shipyard, it becomes obvious that the federal
government has a direct impact on the cluster and its development. Seen from this
perspective, it would seem obvious to assume that government has had a major role in the
development of the Gulf Coast shipbuilding cluster. Therefore, it is important to
understand how the participants of this study perceive the impact of this shipyard.
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Northrop Grumman acquired Litton Industries shipyard in Pascagoula, MS, in
2001 (see Figure 5) and it currently has 18,000 employees in its Gulf Coast operations
and facilities, including the shipyard in Pascagoula, MS; the composite R&D facility in
Gulfport, MS; and the components and subassemblies facility in Tallulah, LA. In 2008,
the Gulf Coast operations merged with the Newport News operations in Virginia,
forming a single integrated shipbuilding sector and becoming the largest supplier of U.S.
Navy surface combatant warships, having built over 41% of the U.S. Navy’s fleet of
warships (Northrop Grumman, 2009).
Two main themes emerged. First, some perceive Northrop Grumman as the major
player in the region and therefore attribute the existence of the cluster to this particular
shipyard. They justify this argument by saying that thanks to the Northrop Grumman
shipyard and its long history, a stable supply of jobs has been provided that continues to
this day. This steady supply of jobs has allowed for shipbuilding “culture” to emerge and
strengthen generation after generation. As a participant put it, “I know Northrop
Grumman and its predecessors were here at an early point but really have helped
develop a pretty robust shipbuilding culture that involves many different types of
shipbuilding.”
Furthermore and specifically referring to the Mississippi Gulf Coast a participant
argued that “Ingalls got it all kicked off … a lot of businesses setup along the coast to
support the Ingalls shipbuilding [and] as that grew and time went on not only synergy
came into effect, I don’t know a better word to put it, than just cannibalism came into
effect as another industry saw the opportunity to move close [to Ingalls], use a workforce
that was already available that had some training in shipbuilding to build its company
or build its business and so you get a little bit of cluster developing.”
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On the other hand, some participants acknowledged that Northrop Grumman is
one of the major players of the region but that the cluster would exist regardless. They
argued that shipbuilding has been part of the region before Northrop/Litton/Ingalls
because of the geographic comparative advantage (e.g., availability of deep water and
large bodies of water) of the region. This unique advantage has allowed also for
shipbuilding “culture” to emerge, serving as the bedrock of a shipbuilding cluster along
the Gulf Coast. They do recognize, however, that Northrop Grumman has enhanced the
existent cluster, making it more competitive.
As shown in Table 18, 62% of nonprofit participants that responded to this
question perceived Northrop Grumman as the major player followed by 60.5% of
industry respondents and 59.1% of government participants. On the other hand, 40.8% of
government respondents perceived the cluster to exist regardless of Northrop Grumman,
followed by 39.4% of industry participants and 37.1% of nonprofits. Therefore, a
majority of participants across all sectors perceive Northrop Grumman as a major player
in the region. Nonetheless, more than a third of participants in each of the three sectors
considered the cluster to exist regardless of Northrop Grumman.
Table 18

Perception of Northrop Grumman’s Impact by Sector

Sector
Cluster Regardless
Major Player
N

Government
40.8%
59.1%
6

Industry
39.4%
60.5%
4

Note: Columns may not add to 100% because of rounding.

Nonprofit
37.1%
62.8%
6

Conclusions
Several findings arise based on the data analyzed. First, the shipbuilding cluster is
an old and mature cluster. Utilizing a location quotient analysis over time shows that the
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cluster is a mature cluster. Regarding the cluster type, the shipbuilding cluster is a mix
between hub and spoke and state anchored, based on its industries’ shared characteristics
(Markusen, 1994). According to Markusen (1994), a hub and spoke cluster is one
dominated by one or several large firms surrounded by input suppliers and service
providers. Smaller firms may evolve taking advantage of the agglomerative externalities
to the anchor firm’s presence–in this case, Northrop Grumman. To a lesser degree, the
shipbuilding cluster could also fit under a state-anchored cluster since the local business
structure is dominated by a public entity (e.g. a defense plant)–in this case, Northrop
Grumman. However, this state anchored classification is becoming increasingly less
evident as the cluster has evolved and focused on different niches.
Second, the cluster’s origin is spontaneous rather than policy driven (Su & Hung,
2009) based on the cluster’s long history and its proximity to water. The cluster emerged
due to “natural” reasons and strengthened over time, especially after World War II. Over
time, the cluster has created and sustained a “shipbuilding culture” that provides
shipyards with a skilled workforce. This multi-generational workforce has acquired
knowledge that in turn has created a path dependency within the cluster impacting how
the institutions and organizations have evolved. New technology being employed in
shipbuilding such as composites rather than steel hulls presents a challenge to this path
dependency. However, looking back at the history, this skilled workforce in conjunction
with training and incentives from local and state governments will more than likely adapt
to this emerging technology.
Finally, the shipyard cluster has a major impact in the Gulf Coast region analyzed.
Impacts range from providing quality jobs to residents of both urban and rural
communities to providing challenges to the local community colleges in providing
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workforce training. Three main factors are responsible for this. First, the geography of the
region has allowed the industry to have a long history. Second, this long history has made
the industry evolve and diversify, identifying different niches such as the military,
fishing, and oil and field services. Third, the role of local and state governments has been
critical and extremely supportive in the development of the cluster. This role has not been
static. Rather, it has fluctuated from supportive to directive at different stages throughout
the cluster’s history. Interestingly, the federal government has played a dual role. On one
hand, they are one of the main customers regarding the military niche. On the other hand,
broad federal policies benefit and harm the cluster as mentioned by several participants.
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CHAPTER V
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
This chapter is divided into three sections. All findings discussed in this chapter
were based on the weighted 11 dataset. Section 1 will discuss the findings regarding the
hypotheses utilizing Goodman and Kruskal’s Gamma value analysis. The objective of
this section is to better understand the political/institutional context and its relationship
with the extent of cluster-based policies and the impact of the traditionalistic political
culture. Section 2 will discuss the findings regarding the relationships between the
individual components of the model utilizing both gamma analysis and Pearson’s r
correlation coefficients 12 in order to fine-tune Miller’s model and better understand the
impact the political/institutional context has on the extent of cluster-based policies.
Finally, section 3 will discuss the components utilized to construct the extent of clusterbased policies variable and their relationship with Porter’s (2000) diamond model using
means-comparison t-tests. The objective of this analysis is to identify, using Porter’s
diamond, which policies need to be improved to further enhance the cluster and better
understand the relationship between public administration and the shipbuilding cluster in
the region.

11
12

Please refer to the last section of Chapter 3–Participant Breakdown and Weighting–for more information.
For the complete correlation matrix please refer to Appendix B
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A statistical summary of the constructed and component variables is shown in
Table 19. Important to note is that although 23 interviews were completed, 13 the number
of valid observations varied per variable due to missing data. Missing data could not be
avoided because according to the Institutional Review Board policies, a human subject
has the right to decline to answer specific questions.
Table 19

Statistical Summary of Constructed Variables and Their Components

Name
Network Governance Moderator 14
Regimes
Growth Machines
Civic Entrepreneurs
Political/Institutional Predictors 15
Tax Structure
Institutional Arrangements
Elected Officials
Professional Ec. Dev. Staff
Extent Cluster-Based Policies 16
Promotion
Infrastructure
Workforce
Research
Programs
Activities
Investment
Suppliers
Conferences
Regulatory Standards
Trade Zones

Type
Constructed
Component
Component
Component
Constructed
Component
Component
Component
Component
Constructed
Component
Component
Component
Component
Component
Component
Component
Component
Component
Component
Component

N
23
21
22
23
23
21
14
22
23
20
19
19
20
18
19
18
20
19
19
14
18

Mean
22.00
7.71
7.63
7.85
27.96
7.38
8.39
7.16
8.78
55.58
5.88
6.01
8.43
4.73
3.30
3.91
5.83
5.87
4.74
4.85
5.83

Std. Dev.
6.16
2.27
2.43
1.96
7.85
2.43
1.39
2.29
1.06
16.69
2.50
2.44
1.90
2.41
2.89
2.96
2.65
2.35
3.03
3.58
2.51

Min.
11.5
1
2
4
9.5
1
5
1
6
23
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Max.
30
10
10
10
40
10
10
10
10
88.5
10
10
10
9
10
10
10
10
9
10
9

In order to conduct Goodman and Kruskal’s Gamma crosstab analysis, the
variables were recoded into high/low. This recoding was done for two reasons. First,
Goodman and Kruskal’s Gamma crosstab analysis requires the variables to be measured
13

A total of 24 interviews were conducted. However, only 23 yielded quantitative data for the statistical
analysis, while the remaining interview provided valuable information regarding the cluster’s history and
impact in the region.
14
Based on Miller (2006).
15
Based on Miller (2006).
16
Based on Porter (2000).
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at the ordinal level. Although the component variables added up for the constructed
variables were measured at the ordinal level, for simplicity and limited N size, they were
recoded into two groups: high and low. This leads to our second reason. Since the N size
is very limited, not many options were available when recoding the data other than into
two groups. Variables with values above their mean were coded high while variables with
values below their mean were coded low.
Hypotheses Testing
Hypothesis one stated that the higher the network governance moderator 17 score
(more private sector driven), the higher the extent of cluster-based policies. 18 Table 20
shows that 66.7% of those communities with a high degree of private sector involvement
in economic development efforts overall had a high extent of cluster-based policies,
compared to only 16.7% of those communities with a low degree of private sector
involvement in economic development. Similarly, 83.3% of those communities in which
the network governance moderator engagement in overall economic development efforts
was low had a low extent of cluster-based policies, compared to 33.3% of those
communities with a high level of network governance moderator engagement. The
gamma value of 0.81 indicates there is a strong positive relationship between network
governance moderator and the extent of cluster-based policies. The direction of this
relationship is consistent with what was hypothesized and is statistically significant
(p<0.01). Thus, hypothesis one is accepted.

17

Network governance moderator may be public or private sector driven. The more engaged regimes,
growth machines and civic entrepreneurs are in economic development, the more network governance
moderator is private sector driven.
18
The extent of cluster-based policies were measured by eleven policy examples discussed by Porter
(2000) and grouped into four factors. The extent of these policies play a crucial role in cluster development
and upgrading.
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Table 20

Network Governance Moderator and the Extent of Cluster-Based Policies
Low (cbpol)
High (cbpol)
N

Gamma = 0.818
Chi-Square = <0.01
Note: Columns add to 100%.

Low (netgov)
83.3%
16.7%
12

High (netgov)
33.3%
66.7%
9

Hypothesis two stated that the higher the network governance moderator score,
the political/institutional predictors 19 would be more favorable to cluster-based economic
development policies. Table 21 shows that 60% of those communities with a high
network governance moderator reflecting high private sector involvement in overall
economic development efforts had a high political/institutional predictor score, compared
to only 38.5% of those communities with a low network governance moderator score. On
the other hand, 61.5% of those communities with a low network governance moderator
score were low in political/institutional predictor scores, compared to 40% of those
communities with a high network governance score. The gamma value of 0.41 indicates a
positive moderate relationship between network governance moderator and
political/institutional predictors. The direction of the relationship is consistent with what
was hypothesized. However, the relationship was not statistically significant (p<0.29),
rejecting hypothesis two.

19

These predictors were identified by Miller (2006) as playing a critical role in the political/institutional
context that influences the extent of cluster-based policies. These predictors include tax structures,
institutional arrangements, elected officials, and professionalism of economic development staff.
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Table 21

Network Governance Moderator and Political/Institutional Predictors
Low (instpred)
High (instpred)
N

Gamma = 0.412
Chi-Square = <0.29
Note: Columns add to 100%.

Low (netgov)
61.5%
38.5%
13

High (netgov)
40.0%
60.0%
10

Hypothesis three stated that the higher the political/institutional predictor score,
the higher the extent of cluster-based policies. Table 22 shows that 40% of those
communities with a high extent of cluster-based policies had a high political/institutional
predictor score, compared to 40% of those communities with a low political/institutional
predictor score. On the other hand, 60% of those communities with a low
political/institutional predictor score had a low extent of cluster-based policies, compared
to 60% of communities with a high political/institutional score. The gamma value of 0.00
indicates there is no relationship between the political/institutional predictors and the
extent of cluster-based policies. Furthermore, this relationship was not statistically
significant (p<1.00). Thus, hypothesis three is rejected.
Table 22

Political/Institutional Predictors and the Extent of Cluster-Based Policies
Low (cbpol)
High (cbpol)
N

Gamma = 0.000
Chi-Square = <1.000
Note: Columns add to 100%.

Low (instpred)
60.0%
40.0%
10

High (instpred)
60.0%
40.0%
10

A summary of the gamma values and statistical significance results of the
hypotheses testing is shown in Table 23. Only hypothesis one is accepted while
hypothesis two and three are rejected. Hypothesis two was rejected because the
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relationship is not significant although the direction is consistent with what was
hypothesized; the higher the network governance moderator score the higher the
political/institutional predictor score. On the other hand, hypothesis three was rejected
because there is no relationship between the two variables.
Table 23

Hypotheses Testing Summary

Gamma
Sig. Level

Hypothesis 1
0.818
0.01

Hypothesis 2
0.412
0.29

Hypothesis 3
0.000
1.00

The fact that the network governance moderator variable has a significant impact
on the extent of cluster-based policies implies that the private sector is more engaged in
economic development efforts compared to the public sector. This finding is consistent
with what is expected of a traditionalistic political culture in which economic
development is not part of what government does. However, the fact that the
political/institutional predictors variable has no relationship with the network governance
moderator variable and the extent of cluster-based policies indicates the need to look at
the individual component variables to better understand why there is no relationship
between these variables.
Therefore, the following section will take a look at the relationship between the
different components used to build the constructed variables in an effort to better
understand which individual components have a major impact on both the
political/institutional predictors and the extent of cluster-based policies with the objective
to fine-tune the model developed by Miller (2006) and also to shed some light on the
reasons why hypothesis two and three were rejected.
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Political/Institutional Model Component Variable Testing
In an effort to better understand which individual components have a major
impact on the other constructed variables, a series of crosstab analyses and Pearson’s r
correlation coefficient 20 analysis was conducted. The objective of this analysis is to finetune Miller’s model and have a better understanding of the specific components of the
political/institutional context and their relationship with the extent of cluster-based
policies and the political/institutional predictors. Tables 24 through 26 show the
relationships between each of the network governance component variables and the
extent of cluster-based policies; Tables 28 through 30 focus on the relationship between
each of the network governance component variables and the political/institutional
predictors; Tables 32 through 35 show the relationships between each of the
political/institutional predictors and the extent of cluster-based policies; tables 27, 31, and
36 present a summary of the findings.
Network Governance Moderator Components and the Extent of Cluster-Based
Policies
Table 24 shows the analysis between regimes (network governance moderator
component) and the extent of cluster-based policies. As shown, 60% of those
communities with a high engagement of regimes in overall economic development efforts
had a high extent of cluster-based policies, compared to only 22.2% with low
engagement of regimes. On the other hand, 77.8% of those communities with a low
engagement of regimes had a low extent of cluster-based policies, compared to 40% of
those communities with a high regime engagement level. The gamma value of 0.680
indicates a moderately strong positive relationship between the engagement level of

20

For the complete correlation coefficient matrix, please refer to Appendix B
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regimes in overall economic development efforts and the extent of cluster-based policies.
This relationship is statistically significant at the 0.1 level (p<0.06). Furthermore, regimes
and the extent of cluster-based policies are correlated with a Pearson’s r coefficient of
0.388. This correlation was also statistically significant (p<0.09).
Table 24

Regimes and the Extent of Cluster-Based Policies
Low (cbpol)
High (cbpol)
N

Gamma = 0.680
Chi-Square = <0.06
Note: Columns add to 100%.

Low (reg)
77.8%
22.2%
9

High (reg)
40.0%
60.0%
10

The results of the analysis between growth machines (network governance
moderator component) and the extent of cluster-based policies are shown in Table 25. As
observed, 60% of those communities in which the activity of growth machines was high
had a high extent of cluster-based policies, compared to only 22.2% of those
communities with a low growth machine activity. On the other hand, almost 80% of those
communities with a low growth machine activity had a low extent of cluster-based
policies, compared to 40% of those communities with active growth machines. The
gamma value of 0.680 indicates there is a moderately strong positive relationship
between the activity level of growth machines and the extent of cluster-based policies.
This relationship is statistically significant at the 0.1 level (p<0.06). Important to note is
that the percentages and gamma value are identical to those observed in the relationship
between regimes and growth machines. Similarly, the correlation between growth
machines and the extent of cluster-based policies is high with a Pearson’s r coefficient of
0.552 and statistical significance (p<0.01).
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Table 25

Growth Machine and the Extent of Cluster-Based Policies
Low (cbpol)
High (cbpol)
N

Gamma = 0.680
Chi-Square = <0.06
Note: Columns add to 100%.

Low (grwmach)
77.8%
22.2%
9

High (grwmach)
40.0%
60.0%
10

The results of the analysis between civic entrepreneurs (network governance
moderator component) and the extent of cluster-based policies are shown in Table 26.
Approximately 40% of those communities with active civic entrepreneurs had a high
extent of cluster-based policies, compared to 36.4% of those where civic entrepreneurs
were not as active. On the other hand, 63.6% of those communities where the civic
entrepreneurs were not as active had a low extent of cluster-based policies, compared to
60% of those communities where civic entrepreneurs were very active. The gamma value
of 0.07 indicates a very weak positive relationship between civic entrepreneurs and the
extent of cluster-based policies. However, this relationship is not statistically significant
(p<0.86). Similarly, Pearson’s r correlation coefficient of 0.386 between civic
entrepreneurs and the extent of cluster-based policies was not statistically significant.
Table 26

Civic Entrepreneurs and the Extent of Cluster-Based Policies
Low (cbpol)
High (cbpol)
N

Gamma = 0.077
Chi-Square = <0.86
Note: Columns add to 100%.

Low (civent)
63.6%
36.4%
11

High (civent)
60.0%
40.0%
10

The gamma analysis results between the network governance moderator
individual components and the extent of cluster-based policies as well as Pearson’s r
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correlation coefficients is shown in Table 27. Both regimes and growth machines had
statistically significant relationships with the extent of cluster-based policies using
gamma analysis and Pearson’s r correlation coefficient.
Civic entrepreneurs on the other hand did not a have statistically significant
relationship with the extent of cluster-based policies. In other words, regimes and growth
machines seem to be the network governance moderator components with a more
significant impact in the extent of cluster-based policies. This finding is consistent with
the literature in that because of their intrinsic nature and vested interest, regimes and
growth machines are more focused on economic development (Logan & Molotch, 1987;
Molotch, 1976); therefore, their impact will be higher in the extent of cluster-based
policies since industrial cluster development is an economic development strategy. This
is also expected in a traditionalistic political culture. On the other hand, civic
entrepreneurs are not only concerned about overall economic development efforts but
also on other community issues that may or may not be related to economic development
(Henson et al., 1997).
Table 27

Results Summary between Network Governance Components and the
Extent of Cluster-Based Policies

Extent ClusterBased Policies
Gamma
Pearson’s r

Regimes

Growth
Machines
0.680*
0.552**

0.680*
0.388*

Civic
Entrepreneurs
0.077
0.386

Note: * significant at the 0.1 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the
0.01 level; Pearson’s r is two-tailed.
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Network Governance Moderator Components and the Political/Institutional
Predictors
The results of the analysis between regimes (network governance moderator
component) and the political/institutional predictors are shown in Table 28. As observed,
66.7% of those communities where the regimes were very active also had
political/institutional predictors more favorable to overall economic development efforts,
compared to 40% of those communities where regimes were not very active. On the other
hand, 60% of those communities where regimes were not very active also had
unfavorable political/institutional predictors to economic development efforts in general,
compared to 33.3% of those communities where regimes were very active. The gamma
value of 0.5 indicates there is a moderately strong positive relationship between regimes
and political/institutional predictors. However, this relationship is not statistically
significant (p<0.19). Further, the correlation coefficient between regimes and
political/institutional predictors of 0.541 indicates a moderately strong positive
correlation and is statistically significant (p<0.01).
Table 28

Regimes and Political/Institutional Predictors
Low (instpred)
High (instpred)
N

Gamma = 0.500
Chi-Square = <0.19
Note: Columns add to 100%.

Low (reg)
60.0%
40.0%
10

High (reg)
33.3%
66.7%
12

The results of the analysis between growth machines (network governance
moderator component) and the political/institutional predictors are shown in Table 29. As
observed, 54.5% of those communities where the activity level of growth machines was
high also had the political/institutional predictors aligned above the mean toward overall
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economic development, compared to only a third (33.3%) of those communities with not
as active growth machines. On the other hand, 66.7% of those communities with a low
growth machine activity also had a low political/institutional score, compared to 45.5%
of those communities with active growth machines. The gamma value of 0.412 indicates
there is a moderately strong relationship between growth machines and the
political/institutional predictors. The direction of the relationship is consistent in how it
would be hypothesized. However, this relationship was not statistically significant
(p<0.33). Similarly, Pearson’s r correlation coefficient of 0.273 is not statistically
significant (p<0.23).
Table 29

Growth Machines and Political/Institutional Predictors
Low (instpred)
High (instpred)
N

Gamma = 0.412
Chi-Square = <0.33
Note: Columns add to 100%.

Low (grwmach)
66.7%
33.3%
9

High (grwmach)
45.5%
54.5%
11

The analysis between the activity level of civic entrepreneurs (network
governance moderator component) and the political/institutional predictors is shown in
Table 30. As observed, 66.7% of those communities with a high activity level of civic
entrepreneurs also had political/institutional predictors more aligned to overall economic
development, compared to less than a third (27.3%) of communities with low activity of
civic entrepreneurs. Similarly, 72.7% of those communities with a low engagement level
of civic entrepreneurs also had low political/institutional predictors, compared to 33.3%
of communities with very active civic entrepreneurs. The gamma value of 0.684 indicates
there is a strong relationship between the engagement level of civic entrepreneurs and the
86

political/institutional predictors of overall economic development. Furthermore, this
relationship was statistically significant (p<0.03). Further, Pearson’s r correlation
coefficient of 0.251 is not statistically significant (p<0.24).
Table 30

Civic Entrepreneurs and Political/Institutional Predictors
Low (instpred)
High (instpred)
N

Gamma = 0.684
Chi-Square = <0.03
Note: Columns add to 100%.

Low (civent)
72.7%
27.3%
11

High (civent)
33.3%
66.7%
12

According to Table 31, the relationship between the network governance
moderator components and the political/institutional predictors is not clear. On the one
hand, when using a gamma analysis, only civic entrepreneurs have a statistically
significant relationship with political/institutional predictors. However, when using
Pearson’s r correlation coefficient, only regimes have a statistically significant
relationship with political/institutional predictors.
Theoretically, however, civic entrepreneurs have a major impact on the
political/institutional predictors that may or may not lead to overall economic
development efforts because of their intrinsic nature of having a vision, connecting the
dots, and mobilizing resources to get things done. In other words, these
political/institutional predictors such as elected officials and tax structures have other
roles besides economic development. Civic entrepreneurs, more so than regimes and
growth machines, are concerned with these other roles as well (Henson et al., 1997). In
addition, the traditionalistic political culture limits the role of elected officials in
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economic development as well as designing tax structures favorable to cluster-based
economic development.
Table 31

Results Summary between Network Governance Components and
Political/Institutional Predictors

Political/Institutional
Predictors
Gamma
Pearson’s r

Regimes

Growth
Machines
0.412
0.273

0.500
0.541***

Civic
Entrepreneurs
0.684**
0.251

Note: * significant at the 0.1 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the
0.01 level; Pearson’s r is two-tailed.
Political/Institutional Predictors Components and the Extent of Cluster-Based
Economic Development Policies
Table 32 shows the analysis between tax structure (political/institutional predictor
component) and the extent of cluster-based policies. As shown, 33.3% of those
communities with a tax structure more targeted had a high extent of cluster-based
policies, compared to 57.1% of those where the tax structure was not as targeted. On the
other hand, 42.9% of those communities with a less targeted tax structure in place had a
low extent of cluster-based policies, compared to 66.7% of those where the tax structure
was more targeted. The gamma value of -0.455 indicates there is a moderately strong
negative relationship between tax structure and the extent of cluster-based policies. This
negative relationship is not consistent with what would be hypothesized. However, this
relationship was not statistically significant (p<0.3). Similarly, the correlation coefficient
of 0.065 is not statistically significant (p<0.79).
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Table 32

Tax Structure and the Extent of Cluster-Based Policies
Low (cbpol)
High (cbpol)
N

Gamma = -0.455
Chi-Square = <0.30
Note: Columns add to 100%.

Low (taxst)
42.9%
57.1%
7

High (taxst)
66.7%
33.3%
12

One explanation for this somewhat expected finding might be that the tax
structure in place may be targeted toward other industries and not shipbuilding.
Therefore, communities with a more targeted tax structure do not necessarily have a high
extent of cluster-based policies since their target industries are either not clustered or not
in shipbuilding. Another possible explanation for this may be the fact that state
governments define the overall context for development (Agranoff & McGuire, 1998),
including tax structures, and these in turn may or may not allow for targeted tax
structures at the local level.
The analysis between institutional arrangements (political/institutional predictor
component) and the extent of cluster-based policies are shown in Table 33. As observed,
71.4% of those communities that perceived institutional arrangements were easier as a
result of belonging to a regional organization had a higher extent of cluster-based
policies, compared to only a quarter of communities that perceived institutional
arrangements not made as easy. On the other hand, 75% of those communities that
perceived institutional arrangements as not easier also had a low extent of cluster-based
policies, compared to only 28.6% with easier perceived institutional arrangements. The
gamma value of 0.765 indicates there is a strong relationship between institutional
arrangements and the extent of cluster-based policies. This relationship is statistically
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significant (p<0.04). Further, Pearson’s r correlation coefficient of 0.599 is statistically
significant (p<0.01), indicating a moderately positive strong correlation.
Table 33

Institutional Arrangements and the Extent of Cluster-Based Policies
Low (cbpol)
High (cbpol)
N

Gamma = 0.765
Chi-Square = <0.04
Note: Columns add to 100%.

Low (instarr)
75.0%
25.0%
8

High (instarr)
28.6%
71.4%
7

The previous finding of a statistically significant relationship between
institutional arrangements and the extent of cluster-based policies makes sense and is
important considering the traditionalistic political culture. In order to have a successful
cluster strategy including cluster-based policies, regional approaches are required for the
cluster’s development and sustainability since they may cross county and state lines.
Therefore, the easier and more efficient the institutional arrangements are, the more likely
the region will have a higher extent of cluster-based policies.
The analysis between elected officials and the extent of cluster-based policies in
the Gulf Coast region are shown in Table 34. As observed, only 33.3% of those
communities whose elected officials had a long-term and regional vision for overall
economic development also had a high extent of cluster-based policies, compared to
62.5% of communities with elected officials with regional and long-term perspectives.
On the other hand, 37.5% of those communities with elected officials not having longterm and regional perspectives regarding overall economic development had a low extent
of cluster-based policies, compared to 66.7% of those communities whose elected
officials did have regional and long-term perspectives. The gamma value of -0.538
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indicates there is a moderately strong negative relationship. This relationship is not
consistent with what could be hypothesized. However, this finding was expected because
of the traditionalistic political culture in the region. This relationship is not statistically
significant (p<0.18). Similarly, Pearson’s r correlation coefficient of -0.071 is not
statistically significant (p<0.76).
Table 34

Elected Officials and the Extent of Cluster-Based Policies
Low (cbpol)
High (cbpol)
N

Gamma = -0.538
Chi-Square = <0.18
Note: Columns add to 100%.

Low (eleoff)
37.5%
62.5%
8

High (eleoff)
66.7%
33.3%
12

Two explanations for this finding are possible. According to Frederickson (2005)
elected officials serving legislative functions are less likely to cooperate and collaborate
with other political jurisdictions, and therefore, the extent of cluster-based policies, which
are intrinsically regional in nature, would not be high. A second explanation could be that
perhaps elected officials with a long-term and regional perspective are not the majority
necessary for regional policies to be implemented, showing a negative relationship
between the variables. Future studies could focus on separating elected officials that have
more legislative functions and those that have more executive functions. Similarly, the
need to survey all elected officials is warranted to analyze the lack of a majority issue.
The analysis between professional economic development staff and the extent of
cluster-based policies is shown in Table 35. Almost half of those communities or 46.2%
with a perceived economic development staff as being very professional also had a high
extent of cluster-based policies in place, compared to 28.6% perceiving their economic
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development staff to be not as professional. Similarly, 71.4% of those communities that
perceived their economic development officials as not being very professional also had a
low extent of cluster-based policies, compared to 53.8% of those communities that
perceived their economic development staff to be very professional. The gamma value of
0.364 indicates there is a moderate positive relationship between professional economic
development staff and the extent of cluster-based policies. The direction of the
relationship is consistent with what was hypothesized. However, this relationship is not
statistically significant (p<0.42). Interestingly, Pearson’s r correlation coefficient of 0.547
is statistically significant (p<0.01), indicating a moderately strong positive correlation
between these variables.
Table 35

Professional Economic Development Staff and the Extent of Cluster-Based
Policies
Low (cbpol)
High (cbpol)
N

Gamma = 0.364
Chi-Square = <0.42
Note: Columns add to 100%.

Low (edprof)
71.4%
28.6%
7

High (edprof)
53.8%
46.2%
13

A summary of the findings between political/institutional predictors and the
extent of cluster-based policies are shown in Table 36. As observed, institutional
arrangements and professional economic development staff to a certain degree are the
only political/institutional predictors impacting the extent of cluster-based policies. This
is not surprising because of the fact that having better and more efficient institutional
arrangements is one of the characteristics of regions implementing cluster-based policies
as well as professional economic development staffs. Therefore, communities that belong
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to regional organizations and have better and more efficient institutional arrangements
are more likely to have a greater extent of cluster-based policies. On the other hand,
professional economic development staff has a partial impact on the extent of clusterbased policies since they have a moderately strong positive correlation with the extent of
cluster-based policies.
Table 36

Results Summary between Political/Institutional Components and the Extent
of Cluster-Based Policies

Extent ClusterBased Policies
Gamma
Pearson’s r

Tax
Structure
-0.455
0.065

Institutional
Arrangements
0.765**
0.599***

Elected
Officials
-0.538
-0.071

Prof. Economic
Dev. Staff
0.364
0.547***

Note: * significant at the 0.1 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the
0.01 level; Pearson’s r is two-tailed.
In summary, several components within the constructed variables standout as
having a major impact on the extent of cluster-based policies based on two statistical
analyses: Goodman and Kruskal’s Gamma and Pearson’s r Correlation Coefficient. A
revised political/institutional model as well as the implications of the findings will be
discussed in Chapter 6.
Extent of Cluster-Based Policies and Porter’s Diamond
According to Porter (2000), among the basic roles government can play in
economic development include providing a macroeconomic and political stability,
improving general microeconomic capacity, and establishing the overall microeconomic
rules and incentives governing competition. However, Porter also argues that in addition
to these macroeconomic development roles, government can and should play a more
crucial role: “facilitating cluster development and upgrading” (p. 26).
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Furthermore and using his diamond model as framework, Porter (2000) groups a
series of policies that government can implement to facilitate the process through which a
cluster can develop and upgrade. These policies are grouped in each of the four factors
discussed by Porter (2000) in his diamond model: (1) context for firm strategy and
rivalry, (2) factor (input) conditions, (3) related and supporting industries, and (4)
demand conditions. See Table 37.
Since the political culture in the region is traditionalistic, it is expected that factors
two and three will be enhanced by policies while factors one and four will not since these
require a more active role of government. As observed, the distribution of cluster-based
policies per factor is not the same for this particular study. Factor one has two
components; factor two has five components; factor three has three components; and
factor four has only one component.
Table 37

Cluster-Based Policies Components and Porter’s (2000) Factors

No.

Porter’s Factor

1

Context for Firm Strategy and Rivalry

2

Factor (Input) Conditions

3

Related and Supporting Industries

4

Demand Conditions

Notes: * these two factors are correlated. See Table 38.

Components
Promotion (prom)*
Investment (inv)*
Infrastructure (infra)
Workforce (wrkfrc)
Research (res)
Programs (prog)
Activities (act)
Suppliers (supp)
Conferences (conf)
Trade Zones (trdzo)
Reg. Standards (regstd)

In order to test the validity of grouping the policies into each of the four factors
discussed by Porter (2000), Table 38 shows the Pearson correlation coefficients for each
of the eleven cluster-based policies used to measure the extent of cluster-based policies.
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The lower half of the matrix shows the correlation coefficients, while the upper half
shows the N sizes. For example, the correlation coefficient between investment (inv) and
promotion (prom) is 0.58 with an N size of 20 and is statistically significant (p<0.01).
The components of each factor have been highlighted to show each of the groupings.
Table 38
prom
inv
infra
wrkfrc
res
prog
act
supp
conf
trdzo
regstd

Cluster-Based Policies Correlation Coefficients Matrix
prom
1
.58**
.74**
.48*
.57*
.41
.20
.65**
.29
.62**
.33

inv
20
1
.60**
-.26
.55*
.35
.06
.31
-.07
.11
-.00

infra
19
20
1
.27
.38
.29
.14
.52*
.17
.50*
-.00

wrkfrc
20
21
20
1
.06
.18
.23
.55*
.49*
.41
.49

res
18
19
19
19
1
.25
.34
.22
.43
.17
.45

prog
19
20
19
20
19
1
.48*
.34
.15
.49*
.03

act
18
19
18
19
18
19
1
.19
.20
.40
-.18

supp
19
20
20
20
19
19
18
1
.19
.34
.56*

conf
19
20
19
20
19
20
19
19
1
.19
.52*

trdzo
17
18
17
18
16
17
16
17
18
1
.05

Note: * significant at the 0.05 level; ** significant at the 0.01 level; two-tailed

regstd
15
15
14
15
14
15
14
14
15
15
1

However, as shown in Table 38 Porter’s policy groupings into the different
factors are not valid (except Factor 1–Context for Firm Strategy and Rivalry) in this
particular study. Promotion (prom) and investment (inv) can be grouped in Factor 1 since
the correlation between them is moderately strong and statistically significant. On the
other hand, the data does not support grouping the remaining nine policies into demand
conditions, factor conditions, and related and supporting industries. More than likely this
finding is due to the limited N size but nonetheless opens the door for future research
focusing on the validity of the policy groupings in factors argued by Porter (2000),
especially in traditionalistic states.
Since grouping the policies into the four factors mentioned by Porter (2000) is not
valid and supported by the data in this particular study, each individual component of the
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extent of cluster-based policies was analyzed instead of the four factors. Table 39 shows
the statistical summary for each of the eleven components in descending order based on
their means.
Table 39

Cluster-Based Policies Statistical Summary

Name
Workforce (wrkfrc)
Infrastructure (infra)
Promotion (prom)
Suppliers (supp)
Trade zones (trdzo)
Investment (inv)
Reg. Std. (regstd)
Conferences (conf)
Research (res)
Activities (act)
Programs (prog)

N
21
20
20
20
18
21
15
20
19
19
20

Mean
Std. Dev. Min.
Max. Satisfaction
8.436
1.908
1.0 10.0
High
6.015
2.440
1.0 10.0
Moderate
5.886
2.503
1.0 10.0
Moderate
5.873
2.358
1.0 10.0
Moderate
5.837
2.515
1.0
9.0
Moderate
5.832
2.654
1.0 10.0
Moderate
4.858
3.586
1.0 10.0
Moderate
4.745
3.037
1.0
9.0
Moderate
4.739
2.410
1.0
9.0
Moderate
3.916
2.967
1.0 10.0
Low
3.302
2.897
1.0 10.0
Low

Based on the data shown in Table 39, the eleven policies were grouped into three
satisfaction level groups 21: high, moderate, and low. Workforce development (e.g.,
“Transitions Program” in Pascagoula, School of Naval Arquitecture and Marine
Engineering in New Orleans, Maritime Training Center in Mobile) had the highest level
of satisfaction among participants followed by a moderate level of satisfaction among
participants for infrastructure development (e.g., Austal Northern Expansion Project),
cluster promotion (prom), recruiting cluster suppliers (supp), cluster-oriented trade zones
(trdzo), investment around the cluster (inv), streamlining regulatory standards (regstd),
conferences and workshops regarding the cluster (conf), and research in local and
21

The groups were based on student’s t-test with equal variance. The difference in means was statistically
significant between workforce and infrastructure; there was no statistically significant difference between
infrastructure through research; both activities and programs had statistically significant differences with
infrastructure, thus falling in a different group
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regional institutions related to the cluster (res). Finally, both government activities (act)
and programs (prog) around the cluster ranked with a low level of satisfaction.
These findings are consistent with the literature for two main reasons. First, it is
clear that since both workforce and infrastructure development (the highest ranking
within the moderate group) were viewed as the policies with the highest satisfaction
among participants, government has played a supportive role regarding the shipbuilding
cluster. According to Enright (2003), a supportive role consists of one in which in
addition to getting groups together, government provides cluster-specific investments in
infrastructure and education/training playing a passive role. Similarly, this finding is
consistent and reinforces what was discussed in Chapter 4 (Tables 15 & 16) in that the
majority of participants perceived the role of government as being supportive.
Second, this passive role is also consistent with what Elazar (1984) described to
be the role of traditionalistic states concerning economic development. According to
Elazar (1984), states with a traditionalistic subculture is characterized as using
government only to maintain the hierarchical social order and defend traditional values.
Thus, economic development is more likely to be a responsibility of elites and not of
government. From this perspective, it is clear why the governments in these three states
have not played a more active role (i.e., creating government departments to assist the
cluster) in the shipbuilding cluster since economic development is not perceived to be
one of its “core” activity areas.
According to the results of this study, Porter’s factors and the policies that
enhance them do not hold in a traditionalistic political culture. The policies do not group
into clearly defined factors (except for promotion and investment). It becomes more
useful then to analyze the policies individually to identify areas where policies are
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lacking but that nonetheless are required to upgrade the cluster. In other words, future
research should focus on clearly identifying which policies fall within which factor
considering the political culture that has a tremendous influence on how much
government gets involved.
In conclusion, the policies with the highest satisfaction precisely require an
“active” passive role of government that falls within the acceptable traditionalistic
expectations. On the other hand, those policies perceived as lacking and in need to be
enhanced to help the cluster upgrade would require a level of government involvement
that may extend beyond what is considered acceptable for traditionalistic states or more
so for the status quo. Further, improving these policies requires a public administration
structure that inherently does not exist in traditionalistic states. However, network
governance theory provides alternative considerations for how these factors can be
enhanced in a traditionalistic state using formal and informal linkages. The implications
of this as well as potential solutions will be discussed more in depth in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
Implications
Revised Political/Institutional Framework
Since one of the main objectives of this research was to test and refine Miller’s
(2006) political/institutional model, Figure 9 shows a revised political/institutional model
based on the findings regarding the relationships between component variables within the
model discussed in the previous chapter.

Figure 9

Revised Political/Institutional Model
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The arrows indicate the direction of a positive relationship between variables. For
example, as discussed in depth in the previous chapter, regimes and growth machines
have a more positive impact on the extent of cluster-based policies when compared to
civic entrepreneurs. However, civic entrepreneurs have a more direct impact on the
overall political/institutional predictors, specifically elected officials for the reasons
discussed in the previous chapter. Regarding the political/institutional predictors and the
extent of cluster-based policies, institutional arrangements and professional economic
development staff have a more direct impact on the extent of cluster-based policies
contrary to the tax structure and elected officials, which have no relationship whatsoever
with the extent of cluster-based policies for the reasons discussed previously.
Hence, it could be argued that civic entrepreneurs are not relevant when
explaining the extent of cluster-based policies. Similarly, the tax structure and elected
officials seem to not be relevant to the extent of cluster-based policies. In other words,
cluster-based policies exist regardless of their involvement, at least for this particular
case. Nonetheless, there is an important connection between elected officials and civic
entrepreneurs.
As will be discussed in more depth in the next section, both tax structures and
elected officials can and should play a role in the extent of cluster-based policies,
especially if the cluster is to upgrade and sustain itself. It is hypothesized that the reason
they are not relevant in Miller’s model is for two reasons: (1) the political culture
inherent in the region is a major obstacle, and therefore (2) the public administration
structure is not well suited for upgrading industrial clusters. Nonetheless, these issues can
be addressed using network governance theory and the solution championed and
implemented by civic entrepreneurs.
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Network Governance Theory and Industrial Cluster Development
As discussed throughout this research, successful industrial cluster economic
development strategies measured by the extent of their cluster-based policies require
engaged and strong regimes and growth machines. Engaged and strong regimes and
growth machines usually result in local economic development organizations (Beaver &
Cohen, 2004). These organizations in turn require professional economic development
staff and access to critical institutional arrangements, obtained through membership in
regional organizations.
The fact that tax structures and elected officials did not have any impact on the
extent of cluster-based policies indicates that public administration structures need to
change in order to make these two elements significant within the model and increase
their impact on the extent of cluster-based policies. Thus, the critical link between
cluster-based economic development and public administration relies on network
governance theory. In other words, if a political jurisdiction based on
network/governance theory with taxing authority and elected officials were to be created
mirroring the industrial cluster boundaries as argued by Enright (2003), the horizontal
linkages within public administration would grow stronger, thus situating tax structures
and elected officials at the forefront of the upgrading and/or development of industrial
clusters.
However, some disturbing questions emerge: How will traditionalistic states adapt
contemporary public management and administration trends such as horizontal linkages,
collaboration, and cooperation when these networks are characterized by not having a
hierarchy, precisely one of the social elements that traditionalistic governments are
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supposed to conserve and maintain? Lastly, will this ability/inability to adapt have an
impact on the sustainability of industrial clusters?
Furthermore, the potential issues faced by traditionalistic states are exasperated by
the fact that according to Elazar (1984), the bureaucracies of these states are not as
developed as those with an individualistic political culture. The issue arises when
Agranoff & McGuire (1998) argue that precisely that state bureaucracies play a pivotal
role in the development of networks providing financial support, information, expertise,
and advocate more collaboration with horizontal actors such as county and/or municipal
governments, which in turn support and sustain industrial clusters.
Enhancing and Upgrading the Shipbuilding Cluster
As discussed in the previous chapter, workforce and infrastructure development
were the policies with the highest satisfaction among the participants. The remaining nine
policies were perceived as being in place but in need of improvement in order for the
cluster to further develop and upgrade.
Based on the research conducted, three main recommendations arise. First and
according to Porter (2000), the following examples of government policies for industrial
clusters are lacking or were simply not perceived to be at the level they need to be by the
participants: (1) create relevant government departments around the cluster; (2) eliminate
barriers to local competition; and (3) sponsor independent testing, product certification,
and rating services for the cluster’s products.
Second, Pietrobelli and Rabellotti (2004) argue that a proper cluster development
policy needs to consider both a territorial/geographic factor as well as a linkage factor.
Therefore, policy instruments targeting the development of local competitive factors such
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as infrastructure or local know-how also need to target the promotion of linkages among
the cluster such as programs to establish business associations and/or upgrade
contractors. The former seems to be supported by the findings of this study while the
latter leaves room for improvement.
Lastly, using Schmitz’s (1995) term of collective efficiency consisting of local
external economies and joint action, it is evident and based on this study that the former
has been achieved but the latter requires some improvement, especially the multilateral
linkages. According to the participants in this study, local external economies such as a
market for specialized skilled labor, improved market access, easy access to specialized
knowledge, and a rapid dissemination of information are currently in place within the
shipbuilding cluster. Joint action, especially multilateral linkages, leave room for
improvement as well.
However, none of the above recommendations are possible to implement unless
some fundamental changes occur from a public administration perspective. Elazar (1984)
pointed out that states with traditionalistic subcultures stipulate government roles that do
not include economic development, much less specific economic development strategies
such as cluster development. In other words, traditionalistic states and their bureaucracies
simply do not meddle or get involved too much in business and industrial activities. This
in turn poses a serious limitation, both ideologically and structurally, for traditionalistic
states that are benefitting from the shipbuilding cluster to help it enhance and upgrade.
Of major importance is the fact that the role of government (state and local) in
aiding this particular cluster to upgrade and enhance has become even more prevalent and
urgent because of three major recent challenges facing the shipbuilding cluster on the
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Gulf Coast. Two challenges will have a more immediate significant impact on the
shipbuilding cluster while the impact of the third challenge may be felt in the long run.
First, the federal government is decreasing its spending on national defense in
general, including warships. This will have a major impact on the Gulf Coast as discussed
in Chapter 4 since the U.S. Navy is one of the shipbuilding cluster niches. As a matter of
fact, Northrop Grumman recently announced its decision to close its Avondale shipyard
in 2013, affecting approximately 12,000 workers, 5,000 directly plus another 7,000
indirectly (Albright, 2010).
Second, the recent Deep Water Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico will have a
direct impact on the fishing industry, which in turn is another one of the niches of the
shipbuilding cluster. Though it is not clear at this point what the scale of the impact will
be, major negative implications for the shipyard cluster are undeniable. This oil spill,
however, also has the potential of fueling a more long-term negative impact on the
shipbuilding cluster and that is of environmental concerns, leading us to our third more
long-term challenge.
Third, since the Obama administration is beginning to shift its focus on
supporting renewable energy and moving away from fossil fuels (in part exasperated by
the Gulf Coast oil spill mentioned above), this will have a direct impact on the oil and gas
industry on the Gulf Coast, which in turn is one of the shipbuilding niches. If this shift
toward renewable energy takes place, the negative impact on the shipbuilding cluster will
be major.
On the bright side, regional governance structures are starting to emerge that
involve a repositioning of governance and political structures that closely resemble an
ideal political jurisdiction envisioned by Enright (2003) that can further support the
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industrial cluster in the region. For example, a participant from local government
mentioned that because of an alliance that started between local economic developers
across three states, there is an alliance emerging regarding local governments. According
to this participant, “we have now started meeting to talk about common issues and
problems related to living on the coast that we want to address on a regional basis as
opposed to trying to address some of these things just locally.”
More importantly, the participant acknowledged that this “regional governance”
was a spin-off of the regional economic development alliance. This in part responds the
question asked by Provan and Kenis (2008) regarding the reasons why network
governance forms emerge. Further, this participant mentioned that a recent press
conference was held between the governors of Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana in
Mobile County announcing the regional economic development alliance was coming
together at the state level as well. Without a doubt, this form of network governance is a
shared-participant network governance form and has the potential to evolve into a more
formal network governance structure (Provan & Kenis, 2008).
The obvious next step of the regional governance alliance, currently in its infancy,
will be to create stronger linkages, or in Provan and Kenis’ (2008) words, the network
governance needs to “evolve,” between different public managers and jurisdictions
eventually establishing a political jurisdiction with elected officials and taxing authority.
The collaborative governance framework developed by Ansell and Gash (2008) that
considers starting conditions, facilitative leadership, institutional design, the collaborative
process, and outcomes can be used to guide this evolution. Future research can study this
particular emerging regional governance effort to further understand the impact in both
traditional public administration structures and on the shipbuilding cluster itself.
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To conclude, the ability of government to support and help the cluster upgrade is
more important than ever. The current traditionalistic states will have to adapt their
current governance structures to be more accommodating to support and enhance
industrial clusters. State government needs to provide a “playing field” to spur networks
and horizontal linkages further, making public administration more suitable to upgrade
and develop clusters. Network/governance theory provides a critical and useful
theoretical base on which to carry out this valuable transformation of traditionalistic
public administration.
Limitations and Future Research
Like other research studies, this study has some major limitations. First, the fact
of focusing on a specific industrial cluster limited our overall population and therefore
our sample size. Future studies should focus on studying cluster-based policies in general
within a specific political culture and not focus on a specific industrial cluster. For
example, a quantitative analysis can show that there are several clusters in a specific
region, significantly broadening the overall population and hence the sample.
Future research can also target specific participants for each of the sections of the
interview instrument. For example, the network governance moderator and the
political/institutional predictors’ questions should only be asked to elected officials and
politicians as well as economic developers. On the other hand, the extent of cluster-based
policies should only be asked to industry representatives as well as economic developers.
Many industry representatives declined to participate arguing they were not familiar with
the “politics” of the region. This way, missing data can be minimized by targeting groups
that more than likely will feel comfortable responding.
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Another limitation of this study is the fact that the findings are only generalizable
to the shipbuilding cluster in the Gulf Coast. Future studies should focus on comparing
either shipbuilding clusters across the nation (i.e. the Northeast, Northwest, mid Atlantic,
and the Gulf Coast) or clusters in general in states or regions with different political
cultures. Different political cultures can yield interesting information about which factors
the policies can be grouped in or even more factors that are involved. Furthermore, only
large- and medium-sized shipyards were contacted, leaving out numerous smaller
shipyards as well as supporting and related industries such as suppliers and community
colleges. This was done because the objective of this study was to understand the
political/institutional context and not the underlying linkages and relationships within the
cluster.
Future studies can also focus on comparing mature clusters versus emerging
clusters and the degree to which the political/institutional context model can help explain
the extent of cluster-based policies. Moreover, an urban versus rural cluster study
utilizing the revised model as a framework would yield interesting information on the
capacity and ability of rural areas to support and sustain industrial clusters.
However, the major potential for future research relies on studying the effects and
influence that an industrial cluster, such as the shipbuilding cluster on the Gulf Coast, has
on the political jurisdictions and public administration organization. Utilizing network
governance theory as a framework, it would be interesting to study the emerging
cooperation and collaboration efforts across county and state lines such as the one taking
place between county councils and commissions in both Mississippi and Alabama with
the support of both state governments. This is the greatest contribution a cluster-based
economic development strategy can give to public administration.
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APPENDIX A
INTERVIEW INSTRUMENT
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Cluster History
1. - From your perspective, could you provide a brief history of the shipbuilding cluster
in this region?
1a. - To what degree do you think the local/state government has aided or
changed the historical trajectory of the shipbuilding cluster in your region? Do
you think the Gulf Coast region would have a shipbuilding “mega-cluster” even if
Northrop Grumman had not been located here in the 1930’s?
1b. Based on this brief history, overall what would you say government’s
(city/county/state) role 22 has been regarding the development of the cluster? What
about currently?
1) Non-existent
2) Catalytic
3) Supportive
4) Directive
5) Interventionist
Network Governance
2. - Regarding economic development efforts in the community and using a scale from 1
to 10 (1 being the weakest/lowest and 10 being the strongest/higher) 23:
2a. – Would you say the regimes existent in the city/county are weak/strong?
(Regimes are informal yet stable groups that have access to institutional resources
and have a significant impact on local economic development policy and
implementation) [reg]
2b. – What about the engagement level of local growth machines? Is it low/high?
(Growth machines are individuals or institutions that directly benefit from
economic development. For example landowners, bankers, lawyers, etc.)
[grwmach]
2c. – What about the activity level of civic entrepreneurs in the city/county? Is it
low/high? (Civic entrepreneurs are primarily individuals from private-sector
businesses but also include public and civic organizations that help forge
powerful productive linkages bringing their vision and commitment) [civent]

22

Categories were obtained from Enright (2003). Each category will be explained in detail to each of the
respondents
23
Specific examples of each of these groups will be discussed during the interview. These groups were
obtained from Miller (2006)
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Political/Institutional Predictors
3. – Using a scale from 1 to 10, 1 being least favorable (more general tax structure such
as machine & tools tax) to 10 being the most favorable 24 (more targeted incentives), how
would you categorize the city/county/state tax structure regarding economic
development? [taxst]
4. – Is this particular community a member of a regional economic development
organization (yes/no) 25? If yes and using a scale from 1 to 10 (1 not making institutional
arrangements easier at all to 10 making institutional arrangements easier), do you think
this membership makes institutional arrangements easier? [instarr]
5. – Using a scale from 1 to 10, 1 being not having long-term and regional perspectives to
10 being all about long-term and regionalism, do you think the majority or more
influential city/county/state elected officials have a long-term and regional perspective
regarding economic development 26? [eleoff]
6. – Using a scale from 1 to 10, 10 being very professional (from a knowledgeable
perspective), how professional is the city/county/state staff involved in economic
development? (For example are economic developers certified professional economic
developers from the Economic Development Institute, Community Development
Institute, Business Retention and Expansion International, etc.? [edprof]
Extent of Cluster-Based Economic Development Policies
7. – On a scale from 1 to 10 (1 meaning policy is non-existent and 10 meaning you are
highly satisfied with what is currently in place) could you please provide a score for the
following city/county/state cluster-based economic development policies 27?
7a. – Advertisements in national/international trade and/or site-selection
magazines) and/or promotion activities in national/international trade shows
geared to the shipbuilding cluster [prom] CFSR

24

A more targeted tax structure is perceived to be more favorable to economic development than a general
tax structure. Thus, a targeted tax structure should have a more direct impact in the extent of economic
development
25
Specific examples will be mentioned during the interview such as the Gulf States Shipbuilding
Consortium and/or regional economic development associations
26
Generally, when speaking about economic development, having a long-term and regional perspective go
hand in hand. The idea is to capture if public officials “get” the big picture, that includes regionalism and
long-term perspectives
27
The following policy examples were obtained from Porter (2000). Although some seem to ask about two
different issues, they generally go hand in hand regarding that specific policy area and cluster diamond
factor. For example, the first question refers to promotion of the cluster in general under the context for
firm strategy and rivalry
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7b. – Specialized transportation, communication, and other infrastructure related
to the shipbuilding cluster [infra] FC
7c. – Shipbuilding specific workforce training programs [wrkfrc] FC
7d. – Shipbuilding cluster research efforts at local and/or regional universities
[res] FC
7e. – Government programs for information gathering and compilation on the
shipbuilding industry [prog] FC
7f. – Government activities around the shipbuilding cluster (i.e. hire shipbuilding
specialists, etc.) [act] FC
7g. – Efforts focused to attract investment around shipbuilding [inv] CFSR
7h. – Cluster-specific efforts to attract shipbuilding suppliers [supp] RSI
7i. – Sponsored forums, conferences, and/or workshops of interest to shipbuilding
[conf] RSI
7j. – Work to streamline regulatory standards for shipbuilding [regstd] DC
7k. – Establish shipbuilding oriented free trade zones, industrial parks, etc. [trdzo]
RSI
Other
8. – What impact (negative or positive) do you think the shipbuilding cluster in the region
has had on the adjacent more rural communities? For example, any impact in the quality
of life, economic, social, or environmental? 28
9. – Any other thing you would like to add regarding the shipbuilding cluster and
government policies?
10. – Is there anybody you would recommend talking to who is familiar with the
shipbuilding cluster in the region.

28

These multiple open-ended questions are intended to serve as a guide when discussing the overall
impacts of the cluster. Responses will be properly coded
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APPENDIX B
CORRELATION MATRIX
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Table 40
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Correlation Matrix

120
Notes: * statistically sig. at the 0.05 level; **
statistically sig. at the 0.01 level

Table 40 Continued

